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Sept. 15, 2026

Learn How Data Brokers Buy and Sell our Data

Learn How Data Brokers Buy and Sell our Data
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Season 2

Join us as we talk to David Hawkins and learn about how data brokers buy and sell our data. This information can get into the wrong hands and then used to scam us.

David works for cloaked, you can find more information at https://www.cloaked.com/

Let’s Talk About Scams is broadcast live Tuesdays at 8AM PT on K4HD Radio - Hollywood Talk Radio (www.k4hd.com) part of Talk 4 Radio (www.talk4radio.com) on the Talk 4 Media Network (www.talk4media.com). Let’s Talk About Scams TV Show is viewed on Talk 4 TV (www.talk4tv.com).

Let’s Talk About Scams Podcast is also available on Talk 4 Media (www.talk4media.com), Talk 4 Podcasting (www.talk4podcasting.com), iHeartRadio, Amazon Music, Pandora, Spotify, Audible, and over 100 other podcast outlets.

Disclaimer: The information contained in this podcast is intended for informational purposes only and is not a substitute for individual professional / legal advice. The podcast information was carefully compiled from vetted sources and references; however, R.O.S.E. Resources / Outreach to Safeguard the Elderly cannot guarantee that you will not fall victim to a scam.

Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/let-s-talk-about-scams--6483699/support.

WEBVTT

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This program is designed to provide general information with regards

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to the subject matters covered. This information is given with

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the understanding that neither the hosts, guests, sponsors, or station

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are engaged in rendering any specific and personal medical, financial, legal, counseling,

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professional service, or any advice.

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You should seek the services of.

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Competent professionals before applying or trying any suggested ideas. The

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information contained in this podcast is intended for informational purposes

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only and is not a substitute for individual professional legal advice.

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The podcast information was carefully compiled from vetted sources and references. However,

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Rose Resources Outreach to safeguard the elderly cannot guarantee that

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you will not fall victim.

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To a scam.

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Let's talk about scams. It's the must-listen show for anyone

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who wants to protect themselves and their loved ones from scams.

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Every Tuesday at 8 a.m. Pacific Time on K4HD Radio,

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Joyce Petrowski, founder of Rose, and her guests will provide

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valuable insights and practical tips on how to recognize and

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protect yourself from scams. And now, here is your host,

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Joyce Petrowski.

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Welcome back, everybody. I'm Joyce Petrowski, founder and board president

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of Rose Resources Outreach to Safeguard the Elderly. Been gone

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for a few weeks, but I trust Brian kept you

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guys going and had some great content for you. go

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to our website at roseadvocacy.org. If you scroll down to

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the bottom, you'll see highlighted where you can sign up

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for the email newsletter, or on the right side, you

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can sign up for our monthly mailed newsletter. When you

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sign up for the emailed newsletter, you're going to get

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our regular monthly newsletter. Every Tuesday morning at 9.15 Arizona time,

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you're going to get a A Tip Tuesday. And you

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might already know the tip. You might not already know

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the tip. But it's also reinforcing your scam prevention habits

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and your healthy skepticism, which is something that we need

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to do on a regular basis. We need to see it,

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read it, hear it, say it, all of that stuff

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in order to make scam prevention a habit and your

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healthy skepticism a habit. We also have our social media

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channels on there. And we just recently started a private

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Facebook group called Scam Prevention Through Education. You can request

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to join on there, and we've got a lot of

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great content there as well. Let's see. We've got a

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guest today, David Hawkins. He was with us, gosh, it's

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already September, probably four months ago. We talked about some

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artificial intelligence and a lot of different things related to that.

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But he is going to, he's with a company now, Cloaked,

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and we're going to learn all about what they can

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do to help protect us. So let's welcome David.

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Well, hello. Hey, Dave. I'm glad to be back.

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Yeah, it's nice to have you back. So tell us

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a little bit about what you're doing now at Cloak.

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Sure. So I had taken a little bit of time

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off like you this summer. And when I came back

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from that, somebody called me and said, hey, you might

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be a good choice for what we're looking for here

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to help out. And Cloaked as a company, what they do,

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they do something that my wife does because she's just

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super suspicious of everything internet. She doesn't put a Devices

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on her mobile phone. I mean, apps on her mobile phone.

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She refuses like she doesn't want anything on there. And

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every time she has an issue with a credit card,

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she rotates. She gets a new credit card constantly. And

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and whenever most people go out and they change their

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password periodically, sometimes. But she does something even worse, which

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is she she deletes the original password and the email

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as well and changes the email. Yeah. She just uses

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different like totally different credentials. And I thought that was

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kind of a smart thing to do as a person.

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She's not a cybersecurity person, but she's just not a

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very trusting person when it comes to the Internet. Yeah.

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And as it turns out, that's exactly what Cloak does.

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So when you use the Cloak product, what you end

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up with is a solution that you start off. And

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this is for people. This is a consumer-based product. It's

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not a big corporate product, although I'm here to help

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with the corporate side of the business. But the way

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this works is everybody has email addresses and passwords that

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go with those. And everybody's got credit cards. You've got

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phone numbers and all of these different things. And they

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all end up being put on these directories that are

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sharing information. Every time you check that box when you

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sign up for a new account, you say, can we

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share this with our partners? And what they end up

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doing is they sell your data to the data brokers.

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And there are a couple of products out there you

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may have heard of that, you know, some of what

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might be considered partly a competitor to Cloaked. Where they

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delete your stuff out there. Yes. They get you deleted

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from all of these different things.

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And then they monitor to see if it comes back

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up and then they delete it. Yeah.

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Yeah. And that's literally what we do. We start out

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with deleting your data that's on the data brokers. Okay.

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And then put you on a continuous constant re-deletion. And

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then the second part is they put you on every

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do not call list that you can get put on

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across the country. So that cuts down your phone span.

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And we're also at this moment working on something to

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get those text messages to stop coming up that shouldn't

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come up. So all of those are the core nature

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of the product. But what Cloak does that is different

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from every other product is we let you actually have

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the same kind of that the hackers have in the

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sense that you can go in and rotate your credentials,

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not just the password, but the usernames, and populate that

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with totally different data, like fake data. And what that

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does is it poisons the web. So all of those

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companies that are taking your data, your real personal data,

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and sharing it, now you're starting to seed them with

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the fake data. data that isn't your data. You still

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get all of the communications. You still get all of it.

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You can use your phone, use your charge card, use

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your email address, and that all stays private and exactly

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the same as normal. Like your Gmail is still your Gmail.

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But to them, you look like, you know, Sally Olive

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at some crazy domain. And it just, it gets rid of,

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it literally not only deletes your data, but prevents them

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to get back in because every time you re-sign up for.

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Something, your information gets out there.

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Right. It's gone out again. Yeah. Right.

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And it's, it's a never ending battle.

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Right.

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I actually just yesterday in a presentation, I had somebody

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ask me, how do we get our information off the internet?

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And I'm like, well, you know, you can do it yourself,

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but you're going to have to, first of all, figure

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out where your information is. You're going to have to

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then go to the privacy policy of all these companies,

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find out what the procedure is to request to have

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your information taken off, go through that process, but then

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you're going to have to follow up and make sure

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that it's being done. And I said, but there's also

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companies out there that will do this for you for

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a subscription, right? So, but that's interesting that you guys

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take it a step further and you actually, I guess

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on the, on the, On the front end, what data

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brokers and what companies see is fake information, like a

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fake username, a fake password, but you're still using your

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legitimate one to log in.

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Just behind the scenes, but to, to like you go

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to Best Buy and if Best Buy has a compromise,

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whatever email address and password you used could potentially now

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be in, in what they call them paste bins in

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some cases.

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Okay.

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It's just a location where all of your credential information

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got put.

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Okay.

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And then once it's there, It's your responsibility, unfortunately, to

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go delete your, you know, you need to go change

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your password. And changing your password is literally only half

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the data that those brokers have. Right. We're giving you

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the ability to change both. And the next time you

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log into Best Buy, you don't use your specific email.

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You use a fake one that we generate, just like

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you generate a password, generate a credential and put it in.

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Okay, so let's say someone's using a password manager. Or

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with some of the older adults, they're writing it down

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and keeping their notebook in a safe, locked place, which

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we always tell them to do. So then they're actually

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recording in their password manager or writing down the fake credentials.

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So when they go to log in, again, they're using

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those fake credentials, right?

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Right. And part of what we do in order to

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make this easy is you could definitely do this manually yourself, right?

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You could go out and create a whole bunch of

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new email addresses. Problem is linking the email addresses back

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to you so that you actually get the messages, right?

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So that email address will be used for the do

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not reply messages that they send. And what we actually

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have in the product is an inbox, right? And so

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that inbox actually receives the email and then it relays

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it down to your personal email, your real email. Okay.

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And so it creates a real inbox, a real email

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behind the scenes inside of our tool.

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And then it's like forwarding to your real address.

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Okay. Exactly.

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So question.

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Question.

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I think I might be missing part of it here.

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When I said that people then use those fake credentials

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to log into that account.

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Right.

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And if a hat, they would use your tool.

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Yeah, because we actually include a password manager.

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To log into their accounts. So what happens, so a

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data broker gets access to that fake information and they're

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selling it. But then wouldn't Wouldn't a scammer or a

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bad actor, even if they had that fake information, wouldn't

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they be able to access someone's account?

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No, because technically you're not using the fake information as

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a login for your personal internal stuff. So you're disconnecting your...

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I'm going to call it an indelible identity. There's a

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part of your identity that's indelible, and that is your

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base root email, right? That's yours. And you're going to

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keep that, and that's your connection to close. And then

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we're going to create this network of... fake credentials that

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you use out in the world. And the vendor, like

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a Best Buy, will see that fake email and the

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fake password. But the communications come back and get sent

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to your personal inbox, your real inbox.

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Okay. So let's say that I go to get into

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my Best Buy online account. I'm still going to use

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whatever username and password I generated. To log into that account.

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The fake one. You're going to use the fake one

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that you generated through Cloaked. And then that entity will

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only have that fake connection. And what's... Let me think of...

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Let me explain something a little bit to help with this. So... Today,

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most people have what's called a one-to-many relationship. And that

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means I'm the one person with my one credential, and

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I use that same email address on every single item

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out there. So it's one-to-many, and many is all of

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the different things you subscribe to. Now, with Cloak, what

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we do is we move you back one step. And

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then do a many-to-many relationship on the front side. On

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the back, you still have the one-to-one connection with all

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of the credentials you create. But for the stuff out

218
00:13:07.320 --> 00:13:10.899
in the field, they actually get a one-to-one connection. So

219
00:13:11.370 --> 00:13:14.450
you have one specific credential that only and ever gets

220
00:13:14.570 --> 00:13:16.950
used with Best Buy. You have another one that gets

221
00:13:17.049 --> 00:13:20.289
used with Sam's and another one that gets used with Costco.

222
00:13:20.960 --> 00:13:25.600
And so those become one-to-one relationships. And there's some really

223
00:13:25.659 --> 00:13:28.759
interesting value that comes out of this. You could give

224
00:13:28.779 --> 00:13:35.350
a cloaked email, phone number, credit card, all together, because

225
00:13:35.370 --> 00:13:37.389
we're actually a credit card company as well.

226
00:13:37.750 --> 00:13:39.440
Okay. So you have the virtual cards?

227
00:13:40.340 --> 00:13:43.700
Yes, we have a whole virtual package. So that means

228
00:13:43.940 --> 00:13:49.000
that there's a one-to-one relationship between your cloaked identity and

229
00:13:49.019 --> 00:13:55.159
this external entity. But all communications, the emails, the phone numbers,

230
00:13:55.330 --> 00:13:58.710
they call to this one particular number that you gave them.

231
00:13:59.190 --> 00:14:02.769
And it's a fake number. It's just our fake number

232
00:14:02.789 --> 00:14:05.909
that we generated for you. And you can set these

233
00:14:06.049 --> 00:14:10.090
fake credit cards in that process as well. And the

234
00:14:10.129 --> 00:14:13.970
cool part is if you use this for subscriptions, like

235
00:14:14.009 --> 00:14:19.179
say it's your Apple subscription to Apple TV, you set

236
00:14:19.240 --> 00:14:22.639
up Apple TV to Apple TV. Now you've got a

237
00:14:22.840 --> 00:14:26.379
fake email and a credit card. And once you pin

238
00:14:26.440 --> 00:14:29.340
it to Apple, you then have a couple of extra

239
00:14:29.379 --> 00:14:32.620
things you can do on our side, which is I

240
00:14:32.659 --> 00:14:36.690
pay a $ 20 a month subscription. I will never authorize

241
00:14:36.789 --> 00:14:40.289
more than $ 20 a month ever. So that means if

242
00:14:40.330 --> 00:14:43.960
they up their subscription, you don't just like find out

243
00:14:44.340 --> 00:14:46.580
a year later on your credit card statement that they

244
00:14:46.620 --> 00:14:51.220
went from $ 20 to $ 25. you actually would get a

245
00:14:51.279 --> 00:14:56.159
message that, hey, we blocked payment this month because they

246
00:14:56.399 --> 00:14:59.240
jacked up their price. Or they tried to put something

247
00:14:59.299 --> 00:15:02.259
through that shouldn't have gone through. Okay. And our credit

248
00:15:02.299 --> 00:15:03.139
card blocked it.

249
00:15:05.259 --> 00:15:11.490
So if I'm understanding this correctly, if, and I'm going

250
00:15:11.500 --> 00:15:14.429
to use the Best Buy example. So let's say I

251
00:15:14.450 --> 00:15:15.610
have an account with Cloaked.

252
00:15:16.429 --> 00:15:16.590
Mm-hmm.

253
00:15:17.370 --> 00:15:20.029
And it's doing all the fake stuff in the background

254
00:15:20.129 --> 00:15:22.789
with all the different accounts that I have. But if

255
00:15:22.870 --> 00:15:26.909
I decide to log in to Best Buy outside of Cloaked,

256
00:15:29.039 --> 00:15:33.379
I would have to use my actual username and password

257
00:15:33.799 --> 00:15:34.600
that I have.

258
00:15:35.539 --> 00:15:41.490
You wouldn't have with that particular company. The created Cloaked

259
00:15:41.590 --> 00:15:43.990
identity is your identity with them.

260
00:15:44.779 --> 00:15:47.440
So if you logged in outside of Cloaked, you would

261
00:15:47.519 --> 00:15:50.100
still have to use that fake identity because that's the

262
00:15:50.139 --> 00:15:51.840
only thing Best Buy is going to recognize.

263
00:15:52.460 --> 00:15:55.100
Right. And you have to realize there's going to be

264
00:15:55.360 --> 00:15:57.950
a difference in the type of accounts you use. So

265
00:15:58.610 --> 00:16:03.230
I'm a veteran. I have login.gov. That is what I

266
00:16:03.289 --> 00:16:06.509
call an indelible identity in the sense that you really

267
00:16:06.580 --> 00:16:09.580
have to use your original credential.

268
00:16:10.039 --> 00:16:10.840
For the government.

269
00:16:11.399 --> 00:16:16.700
Yes, exactly. But this is where you keeping your protected

270
00:16:16.779 --> 00:16:19.860
identity safe and not putting it in all of those

271
00:16:19.919 --> 00:16:24.279
other databases helps you because that is a credential that

272
00:16:24.299 --> 00:16:26.830
you absolutely cannot afford to have compromised.

273
00:16:28.110 --> 00:16:30.250
Well, that's how people steal your identity.

274
00:16:30.970 --> 00:16:35.789
Exactly. So that background identity, who cares if Best Buy

275
00:16:35.830 --> 00:16:38.600
knows that, you know, my name is David. Maybe I

276
00:16:38.620 --> 00:16:42.559
go by, you know, Philip. Who cares? It doesn't matter.

277
00:16:42.580 --> 00:16:45.370
They don't really need to know. They might need to

278
00:16:45.379 --> 00:16:48.809
know a delivery address, but you can actually, you know

279
00:16:48.850 --> 00:16:51.169
how you can change your billing address and your shipping address?

280
00:16:51.190 --> 00:16:51.730
Right, right.

281
00:16:52.519 --> 00:16:56.809
You can put your shipping address as the place you

282
00:16:56.850 --> 00:16:59.669
want things sent to, but your billing address can be

283
00:16:59.710 --> 00:17:04.470
associated with that cloaked identity that has its own unique

284
00:17:04.970 --> 00:17:09.349
billing address specific to the credit card we helped you create. Okay.

285
00:17:11.309 --> 00:17:16.000
So I can see where that helps protect your real identity. Right.

286
00:17:16.019 --> 00:17:17.279
But how does that.

287
00:17:19.440 --> 00:17:22.710
Data brokers then having... same access as they would whether

288
00:17:22.730 --> 00:17:25.170
you use cloaked or not. And so let's say you're

289
00:17:25.410 --> 00:17:31.049
using cloaked and data brokers get that information, not through cloaked,

290
00:17:31.130 --> 00:17:35.069
but let's say they infiltrated Best Buy systems and now

291
00:17:35.130 --> 00:17:38.750
they have your fake username and password and other fake

292
00:17:38.789 --> 00:17:45.670
information with Best Buy. They would still be able, if

293
00:17:45.710 --> 00:17:50.150
they sold it and stuff... Mm-hmm. A bad actor could

294
00:17:50.210 --> 00:17:53.579
technically still log into your account because now they have

295
00:17:53.619 --> 00:17:54.680
that fake.

296
00:17:55.180 --> 00:17:57.599
They could log into your Best Buy account. Right. But

297
00:17:57.619 --> 00:17:59.900
what can they do? If you don't store your credit

298
00:17:59.940 --> 00:18:02.220
card on Best Buy.

299
00:18:02.480 --> 00:18:02.740
Got it.

300
00:18:02.740 --> 00:18:05.660
And you always use it. Yeah. So they wouldn't have

301
00:18:05.759 --> 00:18:09.140
any real information. And if they did, you could store

302
00:18:09.200 --> 00:18:12.529
the cloaked credit card, which, remember.

303
00:18:12.970 --> 00:18:14.430
First off, we vendor lock it.

304
00:18:14.890 --> 00:18:18.069
Yeah. And we vendor lock it. So that means this

305
00:18:18.390 --> 00:18:21.829
one email, this one phone number, and this one credit

306
00:18:21.849 --> 00:18:26.930
card can only ever be used at Best Buy. And

307
00:18:26.970 --> 00:18:31.390
that means they can steal it all day long unless

308
00:18:31.430 --> 00:18:34.359
the data broker is going to steal the information from

309
00:18:34.380 --> 00:18:37.240
Best Buy and then use it at Best Buy and

310
00:18:37.400 --> 00:18:40.740
only at Best Buy. It doesn't work. Right, right.

311
00:18:41.980 --> 00:18:45.720
That's true. So, yeah, definitely protects your identity. And there's

312
00:18:46.309 --> 00:18:50.250
nothing that even Cloaked can do to prevent these other

313
00:18:50.289 --> 00:18:53.289
companies from getting breached or hacked.

314
00:18:53.750 --> 00:18:56.930
No, we can't. We're not stopping Best Buy. We're not

315
00:18:57.069 --> 00:18:58.829
at Best Buy fixing their cybersecurity.

316
00:18:58.869 --> 00:19:03.829
Exactly, right. So that end of it. But it really

317
00:19:03.950 --> 00:19:05.609
limits then what.

318
00:19:07.759 --> 00:19:10.380
A bad actor, they might have a fake username and

319
00:19:10.420 --> 00:19:13.180
password and can get into the best buy account. And

320
00:19:13.200 --> 00:19:15.589
they're going to plug it into their thousands of other

321
00:19:15.630 --> 00:19:17.970
accounts they have on their system. And nothing's going to

322
00:19:17.990 --> 00:19:21.890
pop up because it's a way for you to always

323
00:19:21.930 --> 00:19:26.089
have a different username and password with every individual account

324
00:19:26.130 --> 00:19:29.579
you have, which is a big problem because you know

325
00:19:29.900 --> 00:19:33.019
why they are one of the reasons why their companies

326
00:19:33.059 --> 00:19:35.400
are moving to pass keys is because they know everybody

327
00:19:35.460 --> 00:19:39.480
reuses passwords and And they, you know, still use password

328
00:19:39.480 --> 00:19:42.200
123 and different things like that that are very easy

329
00:19:42.259 --> 00:19:47.430
to guess um, or to brute force into. Um, so

330
00:19:48.619 --> 00:19:50.920
now you, you said one other thing when you were

331
00:19:50.960 --> 00:19:57.329
talking about it that, um, oh gosh, what was it?

332
00:19:57.420 --> 00:20:05.690
It was something about so if you get correspondence at

333
00:20:05.710 --> 00:20:09.269
that fake email, it's coming into cloaked and then cloaked

334
00:20:09.390 --> 00:20:13.609
automatically forwards it to your real address. So you see it.

335
00:20:14.329 --> 00:20:19.880
So privacy concern, how, how does cloaked handle all of

336
00:20:20.019 --> 00:20:23.220
that with actually seeing people's emails?

337
00:20:24.039 --> 00:20:27.440
Right. And, and what, so first off, um, it's a

338
00:20:27.519 --> 00:20:33.339
relay only and your, your account inside of our system, it's,

339
00:20:34.200 --> 00:20:40.559
It's every single individual account. Every single password is actually

340
00:20:40.599 --> 00:20:45.190
in its own encrypted locker. So even though it's just

341
00:20:45.690 --> 00:20:49.619
you might consider it a throwaway credential with with Best Buy.

342
00:20:50.799 --> 00:20:54.240
that one specific username and password is locked down in

343
00:20:54.289 --> 00:20:57.809
its own locker, specific to that one account. And then

344
00:20:57.869 --> 00:21:00.890
for every other account, that's locked down. So if a

345
00:21:00.930 --> 00:21:05.150
hacker ever got into our systems, they're going to find

346
00:21:05.839 --> 00:21:10.240
billions of accounts. It's not like I can just go

347
00:21:10.319 --> 00:21:13.859
in and grab your information.

348
00:21:13.880 --> 00:21:15.859
Right, but they're going to have to get through that encryption.

349
00:21:17.180 --> 00:21:21.029
For every single, every single account you have. Yeah. Every,

350
00:21:21.049 --> 00:21:23.750
you know, you're going to have the one, your, your

351
00:21:23.809 --> 00:21:27.529
own personally, that's locked down to your account tied with

352
00:21:27.549 --> 00:21:31.660
a pass key to you. And it's also encrypted in

353
00:21:31.720 --> 00:21:34.980
its own locker. And then every single credential, we help

354
00:21:35.000 --> 00:21:41.029
you create all individual lockers. So it's extremely complicated. Exactly.

355
00:21:41.150 --> 00:21:44.950
So that's why With password manager companies, there's been one

356
00:21:44.970 --> 00:21:46.490
that I know of, but I'm sure there's been other

357
00:21:46.569 --> 00:21:49.150
ones that have been hacked into, but they've never been

358
00:21:49.210 --> 00:21:52.369
able to get into the customer's vaults because they've not

359
00:21:52.410 --> 00:21:53.869
been able to get through the encryption.

360
00:21:53.890 --> 00:21:56.410
Right. And that's the same here.

361
00:21:56.470 --> 00:21:57.029
The same thing.

362
00:21:57.609 --> 00:21:59.849
Okay. Yeah. All right. We take it up a little

363
00:21:59.869 --> 00:22:03.250
bit higher because we're also segmenting it out for all

364
00:22:03.269 --> 00:22:05.529
of the different things you can use, like a phone number,

365
00:22:05.849 --> 00:22:06.390
credit card.

366
00:22:06.690 --> 00:22:06.930
Right.

367
00:22:07.170 --> 00:22:09.190
You know, text messaging, things like that.

368
00:22:09.789 --> 00:22:10.089
Okay.

369
00:22:10.109 --> 00:22:10.470
Yeah.

370
00:22:11.329 --> 00:22:14.190
And so it sounds like that Cloaked or anybody at

371
00:22:14.250 --> 00:22:20.250
Cloaked isn't really seeing the emails because it's literally coming

372
00:22:20.349 --> 00:22:23.400
in and transferring over into your email box. It's all

373
00:22:23.500 --> 00:22:26.740
done automatically through a program.

374
00:22:26.759 --> 00:22:30.480
We're not storing data. We're just relaying it through. Relaying.

375
00:22:30.519 --> 00:22:31.579
That's what you used.

376
00:22:31.819 --> 00:22:32.140
Yeah.

377
00:22:32.660 --> 00:22:34.910
It's a relay point to take it from the fake

378
00:22:34.990 --> 00:22:35.789
one to the real one.

379
00:22:36.650 --> 00:22:41.319
Yeah. Now, there's a potential. There is an option to

380
00:22:41.640 --> 00:22:44.000
have it, and this is mostly for the junk stuff

381
00:22:44.039 --> 00:22:47.920
that you don't care about, where we can actually store.

382
00:22:49.039 --> 00:22:50.859
You can use it as an email system if you

383
00:22:50.900 --> 00:22:55.500
want to, but you certainly don't have to. 99% of

384
00:22:56.019 --> 00:22:59.079
the customers only do the relay, and it goes through.

385
00:22:59.980 --> 00:23:02.440
But there are companies that are looking at us to

386
00:23:02.579 --> 00:23:07.740
use us for point-to-point communication because we When I mentioned

387
00:23:07.779 --> 00:23:12.289
that we do a vendor lock, so Best Buy credential

388
00:23:12.380 --> 00:23:16.910
to Best Buy, that's locked. And any emails and any

389
00:23:16.970 --> 00:23:20.170
phone numbers and any credit card transactions are locked to

390
00:23:20.210 --> 00:23:23.430
that one vendor and for a specified amount. You can

391
00:23:23.470 --> 00:23:25.950
even time limit it and say turn it off after

392
00:23:26.069 --> 00:23:28.960
two months or three months. So that type of thing

393
00:23:29.779 --> 00:23:33.690
we already have, but we're also working on point to

394
00:23:33.750 --> 00:23:37.710
point phone numbers. So you could have a dedicated, and

395
00:23:37.809 --> 00:23:40.430
this is, this gets kind of complicated in a way

396
00:23:41.269 --> 00:23:43.890
for the average user. I don't see this happening, but

397
00:23:43.930 --> 00:23:46.839
for the corporate world, it's becoming more and more prevalent

398
00:23:47.359 --> 00:23:50.380
where I have a specific phone number that I share

399
00:23:50.440 --> 00:23:54.019
with my vendors. Right. And so my company and my

400
00:23:54.079 --> 00:23:59.049
vendors have this point to point communication where I cannot

401
00:23:59.250 --> 00:24:03.789
get a call from that vendor. Let me say it

402
00:24:03.849 --> 00:24:06.930
another way. Nobody at the vendor can call me except

403
00:24:06.970 --> 00:24:10.559
the person who has that one number. And that number

404
00:24:10.819 --> 00:24:14.460
only works from that number that they have to me.

405
00:24:15.059 --> 00:24:17.480
And I can time limit it. I can block it.

406
00:24:17.640 --> 00:24:20.720
I can say that only one direction, phone call, that

407
00:24:20.740 --> 00:24:25.490
kind of thing. So the capabilities around that, This point

408
00:24:25.509 --> 00:24:29.599
to point thing that we're talking about, it really isolates

409
00:24:29.880 --> 00:24:32.160
all of the places where the hackers have been able

410
00:24:32.200 --> 00:24:36.019
to play because they're looking at broadcast. They're looking at

411
00:24:36.900 --> 00:24:39.900
so many different ways they can use one credential. Right.

412
00:24:40.460 --> 00:24:44.289
And to infiltrate all the employees at the company.

413
00:24:45.240 --> 00:24:49.859
Exactly. So now it's much harder. Today, the biggest liability

414
00:24:49.900 --> 00:24:54.869
on the corporate side is tech support. Maybe you call

415
00:24:54.910 --> 00:24:59.759
into Comcast on tech support. If you're an employee of Comcast,

416
00:25:00.619 --> 00:25:05.269
and you're an executive, you know, somebody can call in

417
00:25:05.569 --> 00:25:09.089
and fake you, right? They can do a deep fake.

418
00:25:09.789 --> 00:25:12.589
And they talk to the tech support person, and that

419
00:25:12.630 --> 00:25:15.930
person says, I lost my laptop, and I need to

420
00:25:15.970 --> 00:25:19.799
get in on my tablet. Can I do that? And

421
00:25:19.839 --> 00:25:24.960
so that becomes a problem for tech support to be

422
00:25:25.019 --> 00:25:26.940
able to tell whether or not you're really the right person.

423
00:25:26.960 --> 00:25:29.809
It is really you. Yeah, because what they'll end up

424
00:25:29.869 --> 00:25:33.369
doing if they do it, they authorize it. Tech support

425
00:25:33.390 --> 00:25:36.430
gives them a high level of privilege for the hacker.

426
00:25:37.670 --> 00:25:39.609
And we're working, by the way, on a couple of

427
00:25:39.670 --> 00:25:44.549
other technologies that will help with identifying deep fakes and

428
00:25:44.569 --> 00:25:47.910
being able to diagnose. Because if you use that phone

429
00:25:47.950 --> 00:25:50.420
system that we talked about, you use a fake phone,

430
00:25:51.660 --> 00:25:55.569
it's technically like an eSIM on your phone. And we

431
00:25:55.609 --> 00:25:59.160
could potentially have some AI monitoring that will allow you

432
00:25:59.180 --> 00:26:02.259
to know this doesn't sound right. It's not coming from

433
00:26:02.279 --> 00:26:05.900
the right place. There's something about the inflection, something about

434
00:26:05.920 --> 00:26:10.980
the cadence of the spoken word. So that's not available

435
00:26:11.299 --> 00:26:11.799
right now.

436
00:26:11.940 --> 00:26:12.859
It's something you're working on.

437
00:26:12.920 --> 00:26:14.140
It's something that's being worked on.

438
00:26:14.839 --> 00:26:17.880
So you brought up AI. So how much in what

439
00:26:17.920 --> 00:26:23.140
you already have that you've explained is AI involved in this? Yeah.

440
00:26:23.940 --> 00:26:27.809
Yeah. So AI is used heavily to do the auto

441
00:26:27.849 --> 00:26:31.750
deletions because, you know, we've, we've got over a thousand

442
00:26:31.789 --> 00:26:34.769
data brokers that we go out and delete. So we're

443
00:26:34.869 --> 00:26:38.190
using AI to monitor the data brokers for you. And

444
00:26:38.230 --> 00:26:41.670
then obviously to delete as well. So, you know, propagating

445
00:26:42.289 --> 00:26:45.910
jobs out to say, delete, delete, delete, delete, delete, you know,

446
00:26:45.950 --> 00:26:49.509
it automates the whole process. So, and there, and there

447
00:26:49.529 --> 00:26:53.150
are other areas, obviously spoofing, you know, Spoof analysis when

448
00:26:53.190 --> 00:26:56.869
somebody is trying to spoof you or deep fake you

449
00:26:57.130 --> 00:27:00.569
coming into a call. Those are the areas where we're

450
00:27:00.589 --> 00:27:03.569
going to be doing more and more with AI. Oh, wow. Okay.

451
00:27:04.210 --> 00:27:08.900
All right. Interesting. Yeah, I was talking to somebody recently

452
00:27:09.019 --> 00:27:12.579
and it was like that we were talking about that thing,

453
00:27:13.319 --> 00:27:17.000
just what you mentioned about you could ask AI questions.

454
00:27:17.730 --> 00:27:20.549
to give you a list of where all of your,

455
00:27:20.849 --> 00:27:25.779
your personal information is in the companies and give me the,

456
00:27:26.279 --> 00:27:30.920
the company's rules to, to request deletion of my, of

457
00:27:30.960 --> 00:27:31.559
my data.

458
00:27:31.579 --> 00:27:35.180
And we do that on your behalf. It's, it's so

459
00:27:35.279 --> 00:27:39.960
easy now. If you don't mind, I'll share my screen

460
00:27:40.000 --> 00:27:42.630
and show you kind of what it looks like a

461
00:27:42.660 --> 00:27:44.509
little bit. Is that all right? Yeah. All right.

462
00:27:45.200 --> 00:27:47.599
So let me, uh, I'm, I'm getting a little bit

463
00:27:47.640 --> 00:27:52.299
more into AI and using it for, you know, um,

464
00:27:52.960 --> 00:27:56.279
putting something in after I've written it and said, does

465
00:27:56.299 --> 00:27:59.559
this need to be, you know, tightened up or does this,

466
00:27:59.759 --> 00:28:02.660
can this be said in a better way or, or something, you.

467
00:28:02.599 --> 00:28:05.359
Know, can, can you see my screen or is this, um.

468
00:28:05.680 --> 00:28:07.740
Uh, now, yeah, it's coming up now. Now I can

469
00:28:07.759 --> 00:28:08.059
see it.

470
00:28:08.799 --> 00:28:12.619
Yeah. Just wanted to make sure this, uh, is authorized.

471
00:28:12.640 --> 00:28:17.519
So I've got one of those, um, Yeah, I don't

472
00:28:17.539 --> 00:28:20.779
want to do that. There's only so much that I

473
00:28:20.819 --> 00:28:25.319
can show here because of the privileges on my Mac.

474
00:28:25.539 --> 00:28:26.099
Oh, okay.

475
00:28:26.980 --> 00:28:33.940
But basically, I've got 104 records removed since September. These

476
00:28:34.180 --> 00:28:36.900
are an example of some of the cloaked IDs that

477
00:28:36.920 --> 00:28:41.140
I've created. So I can go in and you can

478
00:28:41.579 --> 00:28:45.549
see this is a fake phone number. OK, you know,

479
00:28:45.609 --> 00:28:48.579
so and anytime I want to add something, I can

480
00:28:48.619 --> 00:28:51.079
go here to email and I can just generate an

481
00:28:51.140 --> 00:28:56.079
email and it creates this fake email. OK, and then

482
00:28:56.140 --> 00:28:58.900
if I go to that site and use that fake email,

483
00:28:59.660 --> 00:29:02.680
you know, it's all good. And same thing with the password.

484
00:29:02.720 --> 00:29:05.970
It's just like a password manager generated token. If it's

485
00:29:06.029 --> 00:29:09.000
got a username instead of using the email. You can

486
00:29:09.019 --> 00:29:13.240
generate a totally fake username, the whole thing. And also

487
00:29:13.259 --> 00:29:17.380
you could tie in your one-time passcodes. So the idea

488
00:29:17.420 --> 00:29:22.380
is this can replace what I'm doing is I'm replacing

489
00:29:22.440 --> 00:29:25.720
a portion of my password manager. I still use my

490
00:29:25.769 --> 00:29:31.450
password manager, but I'm using for those accounts that I

491
00:29:31.869 --> 00:29:34.490
want to cloak. I'm bringing them one at a time

492
00:29:34.549 --> 00:29:35.130
into cloaked.

493
00:29:35.799 --> 00:29:39.299
So it, the one thing under, um, under the password

494
00:29:39.359 --> 00:29:43.880
is the one-time passcode. Is that a multi-factor code or

495
00:29:44.019 --> 00:29:46.180
is that, okay. I didn't know if it was that

496
00:29:46.269 --> 00:29:47.329
or if it was a pass key.

497
00:29:47.910 --> 00:29:50.210
It's that random. Like if, uh, if I go back

498
00:29:50.289 --> 00:29:50.730
in there.

499
00:29:50.769 --> 00:29:54.440
The second level of security, Yeah. The multi-factor code.

500
00:29:54.900 --> 00:29:56.869
When you go to Best Buy and say, I want

501
00:29:56.880 --> 00:30:00.289
to put multi-factor on, it gives you that little 2D

502
00:30:00.329 --> 00:30:03.950
barcode or whatever it is. I can't remember the name today.

503
00:30:04.630 --> 00:30:07.779
But it gives you that code. And once you get that,

504
00:30:08.119 --> 00:30:11.680
you can create the one-time passcode. And it ends up

505
00:30:12.180 --> 00:30:16.980
giving you a rotating number. Right. So... but it's pretty easy.

506
00:30:17.019 --> 00:30:20.500
And you can see here, you've got your data removal.

507
00:30:20.599 --> 00:30:23.640
So it finds all of the places that are out

508
00:30:23.720 --> 00:30:24.660
there where you've been.

509
00:30:24.920 --> 00:30:28.000
So it found your stuff on white pages and 411,

510
00:30:28.000 --> 00:30:32.519
which is a lot of directories, personal directories, people search.

511
00:30:33.640 --> 00:30:37.329
Yeah. And then so all of these are, you know,

512
00:30:37.369 --> 00:30:40.049
removals that it's working on. You can see that it's,

513
00:30:40.470 --> 00:30:43.170
you know, the trend line is that I'm getting more

514
00:30:43.190 --> 00:30:46.109
and more removed, the deeper it goes. And then, uh,

515
00:30:46.569 --> 00:30:51.690
over time, uh, I'll disappear somewhat on the internet and

516
00:30:52.190 --> 00:30:55.410
the identity monitoring. This is exactly the same thing that

517
00:30:55.450 --> 00:30:59.009
you were probably used to with, uh, there's a bunch

518
00:30:59.049 --> 00:31:03.630
of identity monitoring services that are out there. So, um, uh,

519
00:31:03.970 --> 00:31:06.210
this does the same thing. You put in a couple of, uh,

520
00:31:06.690 --> 00:31:09.359
data points, you can put in more data points if

521
00:31:09.380 --> 00:31:12.819
you want to, so that you can, uh, uh, add

522
00:31:12.880 --> 00:31:18.589
to it, whatever you want to add. And then, um, the,

523
00:31:18.680 --> 00:31:21.809
the cloak pay is, this is where you actually get

524
00:31:21.849 --> 00:31:25.109
a credit card number and you can use it as a, uh,

525
00:31:25.289 --> 00:31:27.269
alternative to your regular credit card.

526
00:31:28.829 --> 00:31:29.890
So it's like a virtual card.

527
00:31:30.450 --> 00:31:31.230
Yeah.

528
00:31:31.269 --> 00:31:34.569
Which is what a bank might have that is tied

529
00:31:34.650 --> 00:31:37.829
to your regular credit or a credit card company, whatever.

530
00:31:38.170 --> 00:31:41.980
It's a, it's a different number and it's tied to

531
00:31:42.099 --> 00:31:46.279
your account. So if that number gets compromised, you only

532
00:31:46.359 --> 00:31:50.059
use it for online stuff, right? It's virtual. If that

533
00:31:50.119 --> 00:31:53.710
number gets compromised, it doesn't affect your regular card. You

534
00:31:53.730 --> 00:31:57.890
can still keep your regular card and, and which is

535
00:31:57.950 --> 00:32:01.150
nice because how many, it's a pain in the butt, right?

536
00:32:01.190 --> 00:32:02.829
When your credit card gets compromised.

537
00:32:03.930 --> 00:32:08.940
And I use, I use our actual credit, inbox here.

538
00:32:08.980 --> 00:32:12.009
So I've got a couple of messages that came in specifically.

539
00:32:13.890 --> 00:32:16.089
In order to come on board, I signed up and

540
00:32:16.930 --> 00:32:19.269
uninstalled and signed up and uninstalled. So I got some

541
00:32:19.750 --> 00:32:22.430
refunds on our own product that I paid for with

542
00:32:22.470 --> 00:32:26.329
my cloaked card, and then they refunded so that we

543
00:32:26.349 --> 00:32:29.990
can just keep going. But you've got the text relays,

544
00:32:30.190 --> 00:32:34.799
email relays, call history, and then all of this works

545
00:32:34.900 --> 00:32:38.200
on your cell phone. So you'll have a pop-up on

546
00:32:38.240 --> 00:32:44.440
your cell phone telling you, you know, spam caller from so-and-so.

547
00:32:44.579 --> 00:32:45.980
It just takes it out of your.

548
00:32:46.000 --> 00:32:48.000
Spam likely or... Exactly.

549
00:32:48.759 --> 00:32:50.829
And then we've even got the ability to have... If

550
00:32:50.869 --> 00:32:54.829
you have a personal website, I'm signing up on this

551
00:32:54.890 --> 00:32:59.309
side right now, but you can create... a fake website

552
00:32:59.490 --> 00:33:02.089
if you want to. And what you do with the

553
00:33:02.309 --> 00:33:06.589
fake website is it's to basically give you an at

554
00:33:07.269 --> 00:33:10.680
domain name for your email. So rather than saying I

555
00:33:10.980 --> 00:33:14.700
work for cloaked.id, which is the name of our company,

556
00:33:15.180 --> 00:33:17.730
I can have this fake thing that is just a,

557
00:33:17.819 --> 00:33:22.119
it's a real domain, but it's not real in the

558
00:33:22.140 --> 00:33:24.940
sense that it's not my company or my, you know,

559
00:33:24.960 --> 00:33:26.680
my name. So it gives you.

560
00:33:26.640 --> 00:33:29.980
The email address then too, that you could write, that

561
00:33:30.000 --> 00:33:35.980
you could use. Interesting. You said you don't have the

562
00:33:36.039 --> 00:33:37.819
text stuff yet. You're working on that.

563
00:33:39.099 --> 00:33:43.089
No, the text messages do work. But what the idea

564
00:33:43.130 --> 00:33:47.950
behind the text messages is it's going to basically key

565
00:33:48.069 --> 00:33:52.160
off of your phone phone book, right? So anybody that's

566
00:33:52.220 --> 00:33:54.700
in your phone book is going to be fine. If

567
00:33:54.720 --> 00:33:56.359
they're not in your phone book, they're going to go

568
00:33:56.380 --> 00:34:01.660
to the, uh, uh, to the probably spam. Okay. Yeah.

569
00:34:03.289 --> 00:34:07.890
I've noticed a lot more, um, numbers that are not

570
00:34:08.030 --> 00:34:10.989
in my contact list that are coming up as, uh,

571
00:34:11.289 --> 00:34:16.489
spam likely. And like I, last Friday I called a, um,

572
00:34:16.949 --> 00:34:20.650
retirement community cause we were doing a presentation yesterday there.

573
00:34:21.530 --> 00:34:24.840
And asked if they had an idea how many people

574
00:34:24.860 --> 00:34:26.860
were going to be there, you know, because I wanted

575
00:34:26.880 --> 00:34:30.280
to make sure I had given enough handouts to the

576
00:34:30.340 --> 00:34:34.199
gentleman that was doing the presentation. And she called me

577
00:34:34.260 --> 00:34:37.199
back on Saturday and I didn't answer it because it

578
00:34:37.239 --> 00:34:40.400
said spam likely. Right. And then she left a message

579
00:34:40.460 --> 00:34:42.920
and told me who she was. And that was actually,

580
00:34:43.480 --> 00:34:45.719
now I take, I was going to say that was

581
00:34:45.780 --> 00:34:48.039
actually a business number, but I take that back. It

582
00:34:48.119 --> 00:34:51.090
could have been her personal phone that she was calling

583
00:34:51.119 --> 00:34:53.630
me on because I would think if it was a business,

584
00:34:53.769 --> 00:34:55.389
it would have come up with the business name.

585
00:34:56.230 --> 00:34:59.829
And just to give you an idea. So on my

586
00:35:00.349 --> 00:35:05.860
cell phone, That's what a cloaked message would look like.

587
00:35:06.380 --> 00:35:08.880
The first one was the actual phone call that came

588
00:35:08.920 --> 00:35:09.389
in a minute ago.

589
00:35:09.400 --> 00:35:10.260
Can you put that up again?

590
00:35:10.719 --> 00:35:13.239
Yeah. So my first number there, it's going to keep

591
00:35:13.409 --> 00:35:15.989
disappearing on us pretty quick because I'm not looking at it.

592
00:35:16.190 --> 00:35:17.369
A cloaked call guard.

593
00:35:17.389 --> 00:35:20.750
Okay. Right. So the cloaked call guard picks up the call.

594
00:35:20.769 --> 00:35:24.480
The call that... kick me off my earbuds. That was

595
00:35:24.599 --> 00:35:28.530
actually a legitimate call. And then, but because I didn't

596
00:35:28.619 --> 00:35:30.869
answer it, cloak, let me know that it was a

597
00:35:30.909 --> 00:35:34.050
legitimate call and it went off to voicemail. And then

598
00:35:34.090 --> 00:35:38.809
the one that came immediately after it was actually, well,

599
00:35:38.829 --> 00:35:42.030
that was actually another, they must've tried me twice, but

600
00:35:42.070 --> 00:35:47.519
there's anytime I get a non legitimate number, it'll tell

601
00:35:47.539 --> 00:35:52.389
you right off, you know, a spam call or likely spam. Okay,

602
00:35:52.909 --> 00:35:54.650
all right. And you can go back through your logs

603
00:35:54.710 --> 00:35:56.409
and see all of that, and it'll be marked cloaked

604
00:35:56.489 --> 00:35:57.110
if it's banned.

605
00:35:58.409 --> 00:36:00.230
And that comes up in real time when the phone

606
00:36:00.250 --> 00:36:00.969
call's coming in?

607
00:36:01.590 --> 00:36:04.050
Right. Okay. Yeah, it lets you, you have the option

608
00:36:04.139 --> 00:36:07.980
to answer or just ignore it. You know, it's just simple,

609
00:36:08.079 --> 00:36:12.199
just like your normal phone operation. Right, right. Nothing earth-shattering there.

610
00:36:13.659 --> 00:36:16.079
So it sounds like, you know, like you said in

611
00:36:16.099 --> 00:36:20.679
the beginning, there's a lot of companies that do part-

612
00:36:21.849 --> 00:36:25.130
of what you guys do, but you've taken all of

613
00:36:25.190 --> 00:36:29.130
those different parts and built it into one, a single platform,

614
00:36:29.309 --> 00:36:30.349
a single platform.

615
00:36:30.570 --> 00:36:32.889
Yeah. And, and done it in a way that, you know,

616
00:36:32.969 --> 00:36:36.809
initially the idea is that most people are mobile heavy.

617
00:36:36.969 --> 00:36:40.199
So the bulk of the app is right here on your,

618
00:36:40.389 --> 00:36:42.699
on your phone. What I showed you a minute ago

619
00:36:42.800 --> 00:36:47.619
on screen was actually, um, the exact same interface as

620
00:36:47.679 --> 00:36:51.860
what you see on my phone here. Um, but, Let

621
00:36:51.880 --> 00:36:55.800
me just pop that open. There we go. And the

622
00:36:55.840 --> 00:36:59.510
other thing that's kind of nice with this is it

623
00:36:59.590 --> 00:37:08.730
actually gives you an idea of, close that. Let's see here.

624
00:37:08.889 --> 00:37:12.199
There we go. So, oh, you know what? I have

625
00:37:12.239 --> 00:37:17.260
to read, there it goes. So it tells me, it

626
00:37:17.300 --> 00:37:19.940
gives me some analytics. This is again where the AI

627
00:37:20.000 --> 00:37:23.420
comes in. Where it tells you the level of risk

628
00:37:23.480 --> 00:37:26.539
that you're at. And, you know, it actually gives you

629
00:37:26.559 --> 00:37:30.030
a rating. How risky am I being? You know, in

630
00:37:30.250 --> 00:37:33.510
other words, how much am I sharing too much information

631
00:37:33.829 --> 00:37:36.329
that I don't need to share? It allows you to

632
00:37:36.429 --> 00:37:41.949
actually get a feel for that. through the system. But yeah, it's,

633
00:37:42.070 --> 00:37:46.550
it's primarily a mobile forward thing for end users. So

634
00:37:46.710 --> 00:37:48.530
for a lot of people who only use their phone,

635
00:37:48.550 --> 00:37:50.530
you don't need to get on a computer to do this.

636
00:37:51.139 --> 00:37:54.199
You can, especially when it comes to the password manager,

637
00:37:54.239 --> 00:37:56.559
you might want to, you know, get a real feel

638
00:37:56.579 --> 00:37:59.460
for what you're doing. You can, you can do everything.

639
00:37:59.519 --> 00:38:01.480
I've talked to a lot of people that they don't

640
00:38:01.500 --> 00:38:03.179
have a computer. They use their phone.

641
00:38:03.800 --> 00:38:04.199
Yeah. Right.

642
00:38:04.320 --> 00:38:05.699
For, for everything. So that's good.

643
00:38:06.039 --> 00:38:10.360
Younger people are nothing but phone. Yes. Yes.

644
00:38:10.460 --> 00:38:14.280
So speak. So it's an app that you would download.

645
00:38:14.840 --> 00:38:15.610
Yes. Yeah.

646
00:38:15.639 --> 00:38:18.489
So then let me, so I, and this is like,

647
00:38:18.530 --> 00:38:21.150
we teach people with the apps on how to safely

648
00:38:21.289 --> 00:38:25.349
use apps. We've created a course, a 45 minute course

649
00:38:25.469 --> 00:38:28.070
on how to show people to safely use their apps

650
00:38:28.150 --> 00:38:31.440
and download safely. But one of the things we tell

651
00:38:31.460 --> 00:38:34.880
them is, you know, when you download an app, it's

652
00:38:34.920 --> 00:38:39.239
going to ask for you to grant them permissions to,

653
00:38:39.719 --> 00:38:44.320
could be location. It could be, um, your contacts. Um,

654
00:38:45.980 --> 00:38:49.030
there's another third big one that I can't, it just

655
00:38:49.639 --> 00:38:53.369
went out location contacts, um.

656
00:38:53.409 --> 00:38:58.579
Financial, whether it stores your credit card, whether it, um, yeah. Um,

657
00:38:58.590 --> 00:39:02.599
has access to your, what is it? Um, Oh yeah. No, I,

658
00:39:03.489 --> 00:39:04.880
There's a couple like you said. Yeah.

659
00:39:05.300 --> 00:39:07.059
And, you know, we talk to him and we tell him,

660
00:39:07.159 --> 00:39:10.760
you just really have to ask yourself, well, does this

661
00:39:10.900 --> 00:39:13.400
app really need to know my location, right? If it's

662
00:39:13.440 --> 00:39:16.480
a map app, well, it's going to need to know

663
00:39:16.539 --> 00:39:19.320
it while you're using it. So you could say only

664
00:39:19.380 --> 00:39:23.909
while using, right? So, but, you know, we kind of

665
00:39:24.050 --> 00:39:26.630
take it a step further, especially with the contacts, right?

666
00:39:26.650 --> 00:39:28.969
And it's like, if you're not paying attention and you're

667
00:39:29.010 --> 00:39:31.119
just trying to download that app really quickly and you're

668
00:39:31.139 --> 00:39:36.340
just answering yes, yes, yes or confirming, then now that

669
00:39:36.639 --> 00:39:40.980
app has access to your contacts. They're most likely going

670
00:39:41.000 --> 00:39:43.219
to use that company. They'll use your contacts to be

671
00:39:43.300 --> 00:39:46.730
able to market their product to your contacts. What if

672
00:39:46.750 --> 00:39:50.409
that company gets hacked? Well, now your contacts are in

673
00:39:50.429 --> 00:39:56.150
the hands of a bad actor. And so, you know,

674
00:39:56.190 --> 00:39:58.190
is to really be careful with that. So with what

675
00:39:58.269 --> 00:40:02.289
you guys are doing and how you would have to

676
00:40:02.389 --> 00:40:07.139
recognize if the calls coming from in the content, do

677
00:40:07.179 --> 00:40:10.079
you guys ask for permission to the contacts? So you

678
00:40:10.679 --> 00:40:12.380
are able to isolate that.

679
00:40:12.619 --> 00:40:15.920
We're not, we don't, that's one area. We don't actually,

680
00:40:16.159 --> 00:40:20.289
that's not a propagation method that we have. Okay. So basically,

681
00:40:20.590 --> 00:40:23.710
and here's the thing, once people get a gist of

682
00:40:23.989 --> 00:40:29.570
what we do, the demand has been inbound, not outbound.

683
00:40:29.690 --> 00:40:31.570
You probably have seen, a ton of people have probably

684
00:40:31.630 --> 00:40:36.670
seen the kind of weird commercials on Facebook for Cloaked.

685
00:40:37.230 --> 00:40:39.170
you know, there's some guy in a bathtub and it's

686
00:40:39.289 --> 00:40:42.429
just some creepy guy trying to call a girl.

687
00:40:42.550 --> 00:40:46.010
And, you know, after we, after we emailed back and forth,

688
00:40:46.130 --> 00:40:48.699
I did start seeing a few things come up. I

689
00:40:48.719 --> 00:40:49.260
don't remember.

690
00:40:49.719 --> 00:40:53.860
Yeah. That's, that's about the only thing we do that's outbound. Um,

691
00:40:54.099 --> 00:40:57.280
because generally speaking, uh, what we don't want to do

692
00:40:57.340 --> 00:41:00.559
is become one of those propagation points, right? So we're

693
00:41:00.579 --> 00:41:05.389
not going to, uh, take your information, pull in all

694
00:41:05.409 --> 00:41:08.739
your contacts and Now, we do have a referral thing,

695
00:41:08.800 --> 00:41:12.340
so you can put in a referral for someone you want.

696
00:41:13.460 --> 00:41:16.280
One of the cool things is the way our pricing works.

697
00:41:16.300 --> 00:41:20.340
You have an individual, a couple, and a family of four,

698
00:41:20.619 --> 00:41:22.360
by default. Oh, that's nice. And you can add as

699
00:41:22.409 --> 00:41:24.989
many people as you want. So after you get to four,

700
00:41:25.429 --> 00:41:27.909
you can just keep adding more people to your plan.

701
00:41:27.969 --> 00:41:29.730
It just increases your subscription.

702
00:41:30.320 --> 00:41:32.820
Yeah. I mean, you're paying for it, of course, but

703
00:41:33.860 --> 00:41:38.199
for all of those services put together, our price from

704
00:41:38.219 --> 00:41:41.760
what I'm seeing is equal to what some of those

705
00:41:41.920 --> 00:41:46.039
individual products each charge for their service.

706
00:41:47.239 --> 00:41:51.019
So what would an individual plan cost per month?

707
00:41:52.260 --> 00:41:55.139
So, you know, I don't, I try not to get

708
00:41:55.159 --> 00:41:57.920
into the pricing of our product very much. But I'm

709
00:41:58.300 --> 00:42:00.000
going to get it for you real quick.

710
00:42:01.159 --> 00:42:04.320
Well, if that's not something that you're involved in, that's

711
00:42:04.380 --> 00:42:04.760
not what you do.

712
00:42:04.760 --> 00:42:06.619
Well, it's because I'm an engineer. What I do is

713
00:42:06.699 --> 00:42:14.400
I shy away from pricing. So an individual is $ 9. 99.

714
00:42:11.239 --> 00:42:16.210
As a couple, it's $ 14. 99 a month. And then for

715
00:42:16.250 --> 00:42:18.449
a family, it's $ 24. 99 for four.

716
00:42:19.349 --> 00:42:20.070
Up to four people.

717
00:42:20.269 --> 00:42:22.369
Yeah. Okay. And then after that, you can add on

718
00:42:22.389 --> 00:42:26.980
and on. But when you compare it to some of

719
00:42:27.019 --> 00:42:31.519
these other services, I think LifeLock for one person is

720
00:42:31.619 --> 00:42:34.679
more expensive than our family plan.

721
00:42:35.909 --> 00:42:41.469
Yeah. And they offer the credit monitoring, the antivirus.

722
00:42:42.030 --> 00:42:44.309
Right. We do all of that as well. I mean,

723
00:42:44.349 --> 00:42:45.369
we don't do the antivirus.

724
00:42:46.130 --> 00:42:48.650
No, but you do the monitoring.

725
00:42:48.670 --> 00:42:49.030
Right.

726
00:42:50.070 --> 00:42:53.079
But again, they're just doing one part. Where you have

727
00:42:53.119 --> 00:42:53.780
all these other.

728
00:42:54.239 --> 00:42:57.380
I have no doubt that the more ground we take,

729
00:42:57.599 --> 00:42:59.760
the more they're going to have to drop their price

730
00:42:59.929 --> 00:43:01.070
and get competitive.

731
00:43:01.090 --> 00:43:04.949
Yeah, you know, it's competition, right? It's healthy competition and

732
00:43:04.969 --> 00:43:06.190
supply and demand.

733
00:43:07.489 --> 00:43:09.570
But here's one of the key differences. A lot of

734
00:43:09.630 --> 00:43:12.170
those companies, none of them are going to become a

735
00:43:12.190 --> 00:43:16.329
credit card company. We're actually a MasterCard credit company. And

736
00:43:16.469 --> 00:43:19.190
we're probably going to be with other credit card vendors

737
00:43:19.250 --> 00:43:20.030
as well down the line.

738
00:43:20.050 --> 00:43:21.579
With Visa and Discover.

739
00:43:21.840 --> 00:43:24.760
I don't know which ones or what timing and whatnot.

740
00:43:24.860 --> 00:43:26.139
That's not what you're involved in?

741
00:43:26.599 --> 00:43:30.019
That's like, yeah. I try and stay focused on the

742
00:43:30.039 --> 00:43:34.469
specific area. Right. But all of the monitoring services, at

743
00:43:34.550 --> 00:43:37.030
some point, it won't be a surprise to me. I

744
00:43:37.869 --> 00:43:41.219
know that we're working on it. that at some point

745
00:43:42.099 --> 00:43:46.219
when some company gets breached, you'll be given our product

746
00:43:46.340 --> 00:43:49.980
instead of one of those products, you know, that, that

747
00:43:50.019 --> 00:43:51.019
service on the backend.

748
00:43:51.039 --> 00:43:54.610
So I know that we're recommended by one of.

749
00:43:54.590 --> 00:43:57.449
The insurance companies now. And by the way, we include

750
00:43:57.489 --> 00:44:03.110
the insurance. So we have insurance on, on the, on

751
00:44:03.150 --> 00:44:05.349
your identity information being stolen.

752
00:44:06.449 --> 00:44:07.510
Oh, so what was the three?

753
00:44:08.420 --> 00:44:14.440
Um, so yeah, we offer $ 3 million of identity protection insurance. Wow.

754
00:44:14.539 --> 00:44:14.840
Okay.

755
00:44:15.019 --> 00:44:16.880
Yeah. A lot of the others do only 1 million.

756
00:44:16.880 --> 00:44:18.139
1 million or something.

757
00:44:18.159 --> 00:44:21.469
Yeah. If you can get one, why can't you get three? Right.

758
00:44:21.590 --> 00:44:21.929
You know?

759
00:44:22.289 --> 00:44:24.309
So yeah. And I think they're all going to kind

760
00:44:24.329 --> 00:44:28.610
of migrate. Everybody will migrate to the same basic picture eventually.

761
00:44:29.110 --> 00:44:29.610
Absolutely.

762
00:44:29.670 --> 00:44:29.889
Right.

763
00:44:29.949 --> 00:44:32.349
It's like you see one, one company doing one thing.

764
00:44:32.369 --> 00:44:34.969
That's your competition. Well, then you look, well, how easy

765
00:44:35.050 --> 00:44:37.050
or hard is it for me to adapt that? And

766
00:44:37.820 --> 00:44:40.760
It's a healthy competition, right? That you, yeah.

767
00:44:40.889 --> 00:44:43.489
And, and, you know, the free market system, we don't

768
00:44:43.530 --> 00:44:46.130
want to block any competition. We just want to be

769
00:44:46.190 --> 00:44:47.570
faster than our competition.

770
00:44:47.820 --> 00:44:50.619
Yeah. And that's a, that you're right. That that's what

771
00:44:50.659 --> 00:44:51.639
everybody tries to do.

772
00:44:52.199 --> 00:44:52.980
Yeah. Right. So.

773
00:44:53.480 --> 00:44:57.739
Well, David, I really appreciate all this information. Absolutely. I'm

774
00:44:57.760 --> 00:45:00.659
going to go in and looked at cloaked and, and

775
00:45:00.699 --> 00:45:01.469
learn more about it.

776
00:45:01.880 --> 00:45:04.840
I don't have it right now, but for your next

777
00:45:04.920 --> 00:45:07.480
week newsletter, I'm going to do my best. I should

778
00:45:07.519 --> 00:45:10.139
be able to get you guys a promotional code for

779
00:45:10.199 --> 00:45:14.070
all your listeners. So that if anybody decides to sign up,

780
00:45:14.159 --> 00:45:16.139
maybe we'll give you like the first three months free

781
00:45:16.219 --> 00:45:19.269
or something like that. And that way, you know, you

782
00:45:19.289 --> 00:45:23.099
can give it a try and, Um, and then maybe, um,

783
00:45:23.679 --> 00:45:27.239
there are some training options on our website to learn

784
00:45:27.300 --> 00:45:30.659
how to use the product, but, um, maybe we could

785
00:45:30.679 --> 00:45:33.380
do like a, a sub video for you that you can,

786
00:45:33.900 --> 00:45:35.800
you don't, we don't have to do a show per se,

787
00:45:36.199 --> 00:45:38.500
but I'll give you a quick video for your, your, uh,

788
00:45:38.570 --> 00:45:40.719
folks to just say, here's how to use it.

789
00:45:41.489 --> 00:45:42.050
Oh, that's nice.

790
00:45:42.090 --> 00:45:42.250
Yeah.

791
00:45:42.289 --> 00:45:45.369
We're working on, um, we just put some vetting guidelines

792
00:45:45.449 --> 00:45:49.300
in place. Um, we're going to have, um, an additional

793
00:45:49.340 --> 00:45:51.719
page on our website where, and it's going to be

794
00:45:51.760 --> 00:45:54.710
all senior related, right? But it's going to be companies that,

795
00:45:55.269 --> 00:45:58.630
that work in, in the senior industry and, and they've

796
00:45:58.670 --> 00:46:01.670
gone through the vetting, you know, process, the guidelines that,

797
00:46:01.769 --> 00:46:05.139
that we've created and, um, then they'll be able to

798
00:46:05.179 --> 00:46:08.929
be listed and, as a resource for somebody that comes

799
00:46:08.989 --> 00:46:11.409
to the website and says, hey, I want to get

800
00:46:11.449 --> 00:46:16.250
my information off the internet. Well, here's a resource. I

801
00:46:16.889 --> 00:46:19.820
need an in-home caregiver. Well, here's a resource.

802
00:46:20.300 --> 00:46:23.539
Yeah, perfect. Yeah, no, we'll make sure we provide.

803
00:46:23.559 --> 00:46:26.260
That would be a good place for the video too.

804
00:46:26.679 --> 00:46:27.860
Yeah. Okay.

805
00:46:28.519 --> 00:46:28.940
Awesome.

806
00:46:28.960 --> 00:46:31.000
Well, thank you, David.

807
00:46:31.079 --> 00:46:33.039
It's been like all summer. I was trying to think

808
00:46:33.079 --> 00:46:35.789
back when I started the show. I was like, has

809
00:46:35.829 --> 00:46:38.110
it been like four or five months since you've been on?

810
00:46:38.150 --> 00:46:39.289
It was like May, wasn't it?

811
00:46:39.690 --> 00:46:40.230
It was May.

812
00:46:40.909 --> 00:46:42.030
It's already September.

813
00:46:42.710 --> 00:46:46.820
I went on a crazy long cruise. My wife fortunately

814
00:46:46.840 --> 00:46:49.599
won a couple of cruises back to back. So we

815
00:46:49.619 --> 00:46:51.280
were on a cruise for 40 days.

816
00:46:52.070 --> 00:46:55.909
Oh, nice. Well, I don't know. It depends. Not everybody

817
00:46:56.690 --> 00:46:58.369
can be on a cruise for 40 days.

818
00:46:58.710 --> 00:47:01.829
Well, you can only get away with that when you're semi-retired,

819
00:47:01.889 --> 00:47:04.489
which I was until I got back. And when I

820
00:47:04.510 --> 00:47:06.550
got back, somebody said, you should come to work for us.

821
00:47:06.630 --> 00:47:09.090
I'm like, this is perfect. I just came back from

822
00:47:09.170 --> 00:47:12.170
a vacation. Yeah. All right. All right.

823
00:47:12.190 --> 00:47:14.730
Well, thanks, David. And we'll keep in touch.

824
00:47:15.329 --> 00:47:15.670
All right.

825
00:47:15.869 --> 00:47:16.380
Talk soon.

826
00:47:16.389 --> 00:47:18.070
Take care. All right. Bye-bye now.

827
00:47:18.489 --> 00:47:23.019
Bye. All right, everybody. I learned a lot of information

828
00:47:23.079 --> 00:47:26.059
about the company Cloaked and the products that they offer

829
00:47:26.159 --> 00:47:30.699
and how they can help protect your identity. Check them out.

830
00:47:30.929 --> 00:47:34.190
We have the website in the show notes. And don't forget,

831
00:47:34.250 --> 00:47:38.829
go to our website at roseadvocacy.org. Social media links are

832
00:47:38.849 --> 00:47:41.989
at the top. We have that new private Facebook group,

833
00:47:42.050 --> 00:47:44.590
Scam Prevention Through Education. You're going to want to.

834
00:47:46.320 --> 00:47:48.559
Asked to join that group. There's a lot of great

835
00:47:48.599 --> 00:47:51.969
information that you'll get. Scroll down to the bottom. Sign

836
00:47:52.010 --> 00:47:54.110
up for our newsletters. We have an email one and

837
00:47:54.130 --> 00:47:57.800
a mailed one. And Brian will be back next week,

838
00:47:58.019 --> 00:48:01.360
and then I'll be back the following week. So stay

839
00:48:01.380 --> 00:48:02.619
tuned for Brian. Thank you.

840
00:48:04.070 --> 00:48:07.070
Well, that's all the knowledge for this episode. Tune in

841
00:48:07.309 --> 00:48:11.409
every Tuesday at 8 a.m. Pacific time on K4HD Radio

842
00:48:11.530 --> 00:48:16.460
at K4HD. com as Joyce explores a variety of knowledge so

843
00:48:16.619 --> 00:48:20.639
you have the power to make scam protection your healthy habit.

844
00:48:21.280 --> 00:48:24.059
And until then, feel free to reach out to Joyce

845
00:48:24.219 --> 00:48:26.070
and let's talk about scams.