June 3, 2025

Data Breaches and Scammers Go Together

Data Breaches and Scammers Go Together
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Season 1

Data breaches give scammers a chance to orchestrate social engineering attacks against unsuspecting victims. The data can be purchased in bulk, and is then used by scammers as a token of credibility to gain trust.
Several different types of scams typically pop up after the breach, some are more sophisticated than others. It pays to know what to expect.
Dr. Martina Dove article:
https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/data-breaches-opportunistic-scammers-what-you-should-watch-for

Let’s Talk About Scams is broadcast live Tuesdays at 8AM PT on K4HD Radio - Hollywood Talk Radio (www.k4hd.com) part of Talk 4 Radio (www.talk4radio.com) on the Talk 4 Media Network (www.talk4media.com). Let’s Talk About Scams TV Show is viewed on Talk 4 TV (www.talk4tv.com).

Let’s Talk About Scams Podcast is also available on Talk 4 Media (www.talk4media.com), Talk 4 Podcasting (www.talk4podcasting.com), iHeartRadio, Amazon Music, Pandora, Spotify, Audible, and over 100 other podcast outlets.

Disclaimer: The information contained in this podcast is intended for informational purposes only and is not a substitute for individual professional / legal advice. The podcast information was carefully compiled from vetted sources and references; however, R.O.S.E. Resources / Outreach to Safeguard the Elderly cannot guarantee that you will not fall victim to a scam.

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WEBVTT

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This program is designed to provide general information with regards

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to the subject matters covered. This information is given with

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the understanding that neither the hosts, guests, sponsors, or station

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are engaged in rendering any specific and personal medical, financial,

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legal counseling, professional service, or any advice.

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You should seek the services.

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Of competent professionals before applying or trying any suggested ideas.

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The information contained in this podcast is intended for informational

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purposes only and is not a substitute for individual professional

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legal advice. The podcast information was carefully compiled from vetted

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sources and references. However, Rose Resources outreach to safeguard the

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elderly cannot guarantee that you will not fall victim to

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a scam. Let's talk about scams. It's the must listen

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show for anyone who wants to protect themselves and their

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loved ones from scams. Every Tuesday at am Pacific time

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on K four HD Radio, Joyce Petrowski, founder of Rose,

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and her guests will provide valuable insights and practical tips

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on how to recognize and protect yourself from scams. And

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now here is your host, Joyce Petrowski.

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Welcome back, everybody, I'm Joyce Petrowski, founder of Rose Resources

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Outreach to Safeguard the Elderly. You can find more information

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on our website at Roseadvocacy dot org. You can find

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our social media links. You can also scroll down to

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the bottom of the homepage and sign up for our

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emailed newsletter and or our mailed newsletter. And so today

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we are going to talk about data breaches and how

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those help scammers and what you can what you should

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watch for, and what you can do after you've been

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notified of one. And I have a guest with me today,

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doctor Martina Doves. She's been on before, so Doctor Martina

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Dove is a research and behavioral science lead at Charms

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Security and the off author of the Psychology of Fraud, Persuasion,

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and Scam Techniques. With a background in psychology, her expertise

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lies at the intersection of deception, social engineering, and the

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psychological mechanisms of persuasion. Her work explores the cognitive and

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behavioral factors underlying fraud, compliance, and victimization. So let's uh,

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let's welcome Martina.

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Hi everyone, Hi Martina, how are you. Hi? I'm fine,

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Thank you and thanks for having me yet again. I

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love coming and talking of us comes great. I am

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going to check really quickly on my audio because for yeah, here,

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I gotta hang on one second. That might be better.

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I was having a hard time here. That is much better.

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Okay, all right, now I can hear you in my

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earphones now, all right, So data breaches. I saw that

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you had just recently made a post on LinkedIn about

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hearing about a data breach that.

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Was Apple, Facebook, Google.

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I think there was a lot of major companies involved.

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So tell us a little bit more about that.

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Yeah, I mean, you know, data breaches happen all the time.

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I think this is just now a face like a

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fact of life. I don't know that there's a company

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out there that hasn't been reached at some point. True,

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And they are very very important because they do allow

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commers to not only with the stolen details, which get

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hard stedn't used, but the GIFs comers a novelty factor

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to kind of approach you with, if that makes sense.

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Right, Okay, And but this latest one, it sounded like

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it hit a bunch of really major major players that

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a lot of people would have accounts with. I mean

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kind of like Amazon has millions of people, Facebook has

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millions of people Google does, Apple does, Right, So I

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think it was kind of a jackpot breach for the hackers,

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and then it's going to automatically be a jackpot for

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the scammers.

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Right, Yeah, it's it's really unfortunate. Like you said, there

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are tons and tons of people that have Apple iPhones,

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that have Apple accounts, that have Facebook accounts, and we

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all use different things like I use my Google, you

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know account for email. I use Facebook to you know

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that Google email to get into Facebook, I use you know,

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so so it's all connected, and I spent I must say,

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I spent a good couple of hours changing password across

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like most of the things that I have, just in case,

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because if somebody gets access to your email, they can

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then maybe get access to your Facebook and so on

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and so forth and use or use the pieces of

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those information to actually persuade you to give them more. Right.

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So that that's an interesting point that you made.

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There is a lot of accounts.

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When you go to sign in, it allows you it'll

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ask you if you want to sign in through Google

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or do you want to sign in through Facebook, not

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necessarily having to put your user you know, your username

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and password in.

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Right, there.

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So if you're using Facebook or Google to sign in

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to a lot of other accounts, now you not only

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have to change your Facebook and your Google and your

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Apple password and all that, You've got to go to

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all those other accounts that you've used Google or Facebook

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to sign in with and change all of that information.

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Yeah, it's advisable to do that. I mean, I I

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you know, it doesn't necessarily mean that a commera's going

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to attack you from all sides, because at the end

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of the day, they'll do whatever's easier for them, you know,

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and it's easy, quick and easy. But I think it's

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always advisable. I always think if you have an email

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that you're banking with too, always change like any data

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bridge that you heard about, always change your passport for

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that email. It's you know, you know, better to be

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saved than sorry, just in case.

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Well, right, because even if you use your email for

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the username, right, and you might have a different password

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for your bank accounts or any financial accounts. But if

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someone was able to get into your email, then they

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could they could be one step closer to trying to

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get into your financial accounts.

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Yeah, I mean, like you mentioned, if somebody gets access

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to your email. You may you still may have access

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to the emails, but this person is logging in as you,

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and maybe they can manipulate a lot of the times,

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Like if somebody is really motivated, they'll they'll just your

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settings so you're not even getting alerted, you know, and

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so like they'll change the email that usually alerts you

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or something like that, and then they can change the password,

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and like, so it's it's it's it's all connected. And

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I think, you know, we need to think about every

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time we want convenience. You know, that costs us and

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I think that's one way that we pay for that convenience.

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Yeah, yeah, and you know it is.

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There's a lot of things out there that are convenient, right,

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but you have to think of all of the risk.

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And it might not be just the risk associated with

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that particular program or app. It could be because things

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are so connected and if you're using your email right

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to log in, or you're using the same password, it's

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all connected. Because if one's breached, you know, they're not

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just going to use it on just one account. They're

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going to put it in their software and find all

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these other accounts that you've reused logins on because they know.

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And you know, it's interesting.

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I read these articles that these tech companies put out

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every year about password statistics, and the one that I

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just read said and it was at least half, maybe

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if not more, people are still using the word password

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for their password or one, two, three, four, five six,

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And sometimes they just choose that. Other times that might

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be the default password that a company has, and when

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they sign up for it, they're not automatically then directed

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to change their password.

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I don't know.

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I think that's true that that companies really need to do.

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Right, If you're going to have.

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A password, a default password like that, then it should

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be when someone logs in for the first time, they

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should automatically be redirected to change their password.

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Yeah, And I think I think the organizations are getting

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better at that, and like they are asking you to

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choose a strong password. So like, I think we have

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gotten a lot better at like you know, but I

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think what I would like to see as well, a

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lot of the times it gets really tricky with passwords

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as well, where like every single company has their own

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you know, like format of how they want the password,

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and sometimes it's really really difficult to you know, account

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for all of the formats and and remember them. So

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this is why I think people default to the simplest

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thing that can remember, which then obviously make it vulnerable.

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And I'll tell you a funny story, and I'm not

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going to mention which relative, but one of my relatives

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has passwords that like it's literally almost like the name, surname,

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and date of birth, and like I'm constantly telling them

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don't do that. I know, for obvious reasons, but yeah,

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it's it's you know, like I'm having to sort of

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tell people like don't you know, like you know, and

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then people just you know, unless you have been breached,

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unless your details were stolen, you have this sense of like, oh,

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what happened to me? Like why would somebody? I hear

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that a lot? Who would want my stuff? Like who

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would want to get into my Facebook? Well it's not

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about you, but for example, you know, like I posted

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something on LinkedIn when this breach happened, and I posted

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on my Facebook saying to people like, hey, expect your

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friends texting you and saying they need money, right, And

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that's exactly what happened. Immediately one of my friends said,

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I just got a Whatsap message from a friend asking

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to lend her, you know, like one four hundred dollars

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and you know, she luckily said can you call me back?

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And then obviously was suspicious and so my message. But

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a lot of the times when people breach your Facebook,

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you it doesn't harm you in so many ways, but

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it harms your friends because then this camera will be

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posting on your behalf to your friends asking for money.

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So I think, you know, that's something that I think

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people need to understand. Even if your Facebook doesn't you

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don't have anything to steal on a Facebook, think about

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how you're getting a message from let's say your cousin

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on Facebook that they're in trouble, they've been kidnapped, they've

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been harmed, and they need money, you know, would feel

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And I think that's that's kind of like I think

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people don't really think further than just like, well, I

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don't have anything, you know, I hear that so many stuffs.

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I don't have anything to steal. I don't care, you know,

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But I think, yeah, it's like what you said, we

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all connect. It's all connected right about.

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It is great because it's convenient to have everything connected,

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right and and we like convenience. It makes it more

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simpler to do what we want to do online and

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not have to worry about navigating through a password manager,

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right if that's not working appropriately, or however you store

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your passwords. But so it's interesting. There's a gentleman here

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in town that I work with. He sponsors some he

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sponsors our program to take our program out to some

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different communities. And we were just I was just doing

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a presentation with him yesterday and he told it was

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for his clients, and he told his clients about how

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he got a call from one of his friends who

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lives in another state. It's a state where this gentleman

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grew up in and his friends saw that his sister

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was advertising this vehicle for sale. The price made it

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seem like it was a fire sale type thing, like

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I have to get rid of it, you know, it's

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a low price because I need the money whatever, And

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he was really interested in it, and he just for

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whatever reason, said I'm going to call my friend and and.

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Ask him about this.

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And so he did and he's like, hey, you know

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your sister's selling this vehicle, you know, online and on Facebook,

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and and he was like, no, she's she's been hacked,

222
00:13:19.399 --> 00:13:22.960
her Facebook's been been hacked. It's not her, But he

223
00:13:23.000 --> 00:13:25.440
said he got that call from a couple different friends.

224
00:13:25.600 --> 00:13:28.679
They were ready to send the money, right, and it

225
00:13:28.720 --> 00:13:32.559
would have been thousands of dollars, but something made them

226
00:13:32.759 --> 00:13:35.759
call him to say, Hey, your sister's selling this. It's

227
00:13:35.799 --> 00:13:37.639
a really cheap price. What's going on?

228
00:13:38.360 --> 00:13:38.559
Right?

229
00:13:38.720 --> 00:13:42.440
And and so it doesn't necessarily affect his sister, but

230
00:13:42.480 --> 00:13:46.480
guess what her friends are going to get affected because

231
00:13:46.720 --> 00:13:49.919
they can lose through no fault of hers, right, no

232
00:13:50.039 --> 00:13:53.039
fault of hers, But but it can affect your friends

233
00:13:54.039 --> 00:13:56.000
that they then affect your friends.

234
00:13:56.440 --> 00:13:59.240
Yeah, And I think like one thing that I I,

235
00:13:59.440 --> 00:14:02.840
you know, I always advocate in terms of the data breaches, right,

236
00:14:02.919 --> 00:14:05.919
Like it's not just the data that gets stolen, Like I,

237
00:14:06.639 --> 00:14:11.080
you know, always say this. Comers really love any novel situation.

238
00:14:11.759 --> 00:14:15.600
If there's a some kind of a natural disaster that

239
00:14:15.679 --> 00:14:20.879
will hit people with charitiescams, if there's a you know,

240
00:14:20.960 --> 00:14:25.279
like during COVID, we had tons of websites selling you know,

241
00:14:25.360 --> 00:14:29.159
imaginary like masks and things like that and hands the

242
00:14:29.159 --> 00:14:34.399
analyzer and sanitizer like miracle cures, like people who buying

243
00:14:34.480 --> 00:14:38.240
vitamins or something like that. And one of the things

244
00:14:38.279 --> 00:14:42.320
that that like happens during like after a breach. Uh,

245
00:14:42.639 --> 00:14:46.759
it gives comers that ability to call you and pretend

246
00:14:47.080 --> 00:14:50.440
it's a bank warning you about the breach and to

247
00:14:50.600 --> 00:14:53.639
transfer the money to some other account for safe keeping

248
00:14:53.799 --> 00:14:56.840
or something like that. So it gives them a narrative

249
00:14:57.000 --> 00:15:00.200
that can manipulate, uh. And then you get tons of

250
00:15:00.240 --> 00:15:04.200
phishing emails too, Like for example, yesterday I got a

251
00:15:05.519 --> 00:15:09.480
text from my CEO my company and can you talk?

252
00:15:10.080 --> 00:15:13.279
And I'm like, I know it's not you, you know, but

253
00:15:13.399 --> 00:15:16.279
like it happens so quickly after the bridge was announced,

254
00:15:16.799 --> 00:15:19.080
you know, so you get lots of phishing emails, lots

255
00:15:19.080 --> 00:15:22.480
of like SMS from your bank, or let's say, Apple

256
00:15:22.559 --> 00:15:25.440
will text you and say, hey, we've been breached. Can

257
00:15:25.480 --> 00:15:29.360
you please you know, change your password through this link,

258
00:15:29.720 --> 00:15:31.279
you know what I mean. So it's kind of like

259
00:15:31.360 --> 00:15:35.639
stuff like that. There's recovery schemes. If you're defrauded straight

260
00:15:35.679 --> 00:15:40.679
after the data bridge, you may then get a recovery

261
00:15:40.759 --> 00:15:44.200
scheme offered to you. Hey, like you've lost this money,

262
00:15:44.240 --> 00:15:47.240
we can help recover the funds. And then some commers

263
00:15:47.279 --> 00:15:50.960
will kind of like get you again, so it gives

264
00:15:51.000 --> 00:15:53.679
them more than just your data. Data is just that

265
00:15:53.919 --> 00:15:57.440
to enhance credibility when they call you, so that they

266
00:15:57.440 --> 00:16:00.159
can say, hey, you know we know your past, do

267
00:16:00.200 --> 00:16:03.279
we know your email? That we are who we are, Yeah,

268
00:16:03.399 --> 00:16:05.639
but it also gives them this narrative that I can

269
00:16:05.679 --> 00:16:06.720
exploit to right.

270
00:16:06.799 --> 00:16:09.200
Yeah, And you know, I talked to a lady here

271
00:16:09.279 --> 00:16:13.879
that she got that very call a couple of years ago,

272
00:16:14.080 --> 00:16:17.240
pretending to be from the bank that there was fraud.

273
00:16:17.639 --> 00:16:20.480
It dealt with fraud versus a data breach. But there's

274
00:16:20.559 --> 00:16:23.720
fraud on your account. And you know, they convinced her

275
00:16:23.799 --> 00:16:27.799
to to you know, verify everything, and then said we

276
00:16:27.840 --> 00:16:30.000
need to we need to move the money out of

277
00:16:30.039 --> 00:16:33.399
your account into another account for safe keeping until we

278
00:16:33.399 --> 00:16:36.080
can get rid of this fraud. And you know, she

279
00:16:36.159 --> 00:16:38.720
wanted to go to the bank, and they convinced her

280
00:16:38.799 --> 00:16:42.440
that no, because we feel it's one of the employees

281
00:16:42.480 --> 00:16:45.320
at the bank that's committing this fraud. And they sound

282
00:16:45.559 --> 00:16:50.679
so legitimate, and they say, you know, pretty similar to

283
00:16:50.720 --> 00:16:53.440
what a bank would say if that really was happening,

284
00:16:53.799 --> 00:16:57.000
to make it so believable, like you said, right, and

285
00:16:57.039 --> 00:17:00.399
they very well. It might have all started from data

286
00:17:00.440 --> 00:17:03.799
bridge where they got her information, but then they used

287
00:17:03.840 --> 00:17:06.680
it as there's fraud going on with your account and

288
00:17:07.160 --> 00:17:10.079
all that she ended up thing seventy five percent of

289
00:17:10.079 --> 00:17:11.279
her life savings.

290
00:17:11.960 --> 00:17:15.000
Yep, I mean no, definitely. I had a similar case.

291
00:17:15.119 --> 00:17:20.119
I spoke to a victim in the UK. And this

292
00:17:20.240 --> 00:17:23.119
is another thing that like it's nothing to do with

293
00:17:22.759 --> 00:17:25.359
the with the with the data breaches or anything like that,

294
00:17:25.440 --> 00:17:27.839
but it's like to do with like a public information.

295
00:17:28.359 --> 00:17:31.759
So for example, this person has just recently sold the

296
00:17:31.799 --> 00:17:34.319
house and had a lot of money in the account

297
00:17:34.599 --> 00:17:37.359
and these public these are public records. You know, people

298
00:17:37.440 --> 00:17:41.799
can find out who sold, you know, so so scammers

299
00:17:41.880 --> 00:17:45.000
will use things like that to then target the individual

300
00:17:45.079 --> 00:17:48.279
that can purchase your details from somebody else. Link the data.

301
00:17:48.319 --> 00:17:51.880
There are data brokers that linked data. You know, so

302
00:17:51.920 --> 00:17:54.720
you have name, they'll link it to this to the address,

303
00:17:54.799 --> 00:17:58.599
to IP address to your computer, you know, like it's

304
00:17:58.920 --> 00:18:01.200
you know, they are legitimate a brokeers that do that

305
00:18:01.559 --> 00:18:05.519
for purposes of targeting from legitimate companies for us stounding

306
00:18:05.599 --> 00:18:10.200
and marketing exactly exactly. And so like she got called

307
00:18:10.240 --> 00:18:14.200
by somebody pretending to be from the uh you know,

308
00:18:14.400 --> 00:18:19.880
the financial like you know, authority that is like a

309
00:18:20.079 --> 00:18:24.119
very I think it's called the Financial Conduct Authority in

310
00:18:24.160 --> 00:18:27.960
the UK. It's like it's a it's an authority like

311
00:18:28.079 --> 00:18:31.480
body that governs all of the banks and anything financial, right,

312
00:18:31.519 --> 00:18:33.920
so kind of like FINRA and stuff like that.

313
00:18:34.319 --> 00:18:36.799
In one of like yeah, yeah, and.

314
00:18:36.839 --> 00:18:39.000
Then talking to her for about a month and a

315
00:18:39.079 --> 00:18:42.799
half every single day updates like what's happening with her

316
00:18:42.839 --> 00:18:46.680
account that there's a suspect inside a fraud. She was

317
00:18:46.680 --> 00:18:49.440
speaking not to one but to two people. So now

318
00:18:49.599 --> 00:18:53.400
another person is is supporting what the first one is saying,

319
00:18:53.799 --> 00:18:57.640
so you believe it more. And then suddenly there's an incident, right,

320
00:18:57.839 --> 00:19:01.279
like you know the person is going to do it tonight,

321
00:19:01.400 --> 00:19:05.519
you have to move the money. And basically, you know,

322
00:19:05.680 --> 00:19:08.880
she the coach of what to say when she goes

323
00:19:08.920 --> 00:19:12.920
to the bank, absolutely, but she believed that everybody at

324
00:19:12.960 --> 00:19:15.880
the bank could be a suspect because they still didn't

325
00:19:16.480 --> 00:19:21.160
find out who it is. So you know, it's like

326
00:19:21.160 --> 00:19:23.440
like I think a lot of the times bank have

327
00:19:24.039 --> 00:19:26.640
you know, bank may be a surprise when they try

328
00:19:26.640 --> 00:19:30.480
to intervene and they don't understand why a person just

329
00:19:30.720 --> 00:19:33.920
doesn't take the word right. But you have to understand

330
00:19:34.000 --> 00:19:39.240
the amount of manipulation that goes in before that carefully

331
00:19:39.279 --> 00:19:41.440
goes in before, because if somebody called you and just

332
00:19:41.440 --> 00:19:43.480
told you one thing on a first phone call, you

333
00:19:43.519 --> 00:19:46.720
would go like, who are you right? You know it's already.

334
00:19:46.920 --> 00:19:50.000
If somebody called you and said, hey, Joyce, you know,

335
00:19:50.200 --> 00:19:52.920
like please transfer this money because like this inside the

336
00:19:52.960 --> 00:19:55.319
fraud in the bank, you would go, who are you exactly?

337
00:19:55.920 --> 00:19:57.839
Transfer money right exactly.

338
00:19:57.880 --> 00:20:00.559
But if somebody keeps calling you for a whole month daily,

339
00:20:00.839 --> 00:20:04.079
two different people updating you on what's going on with

340
00:20:04.119 --> 00:20:07.119
the investigation, and you start to believe it, you know,

341
00:20:07.839 --> 00:20:11.759
it's very difficult to intervene, you know, and then of

342
00:20:11.759 --> 00:20:15.759
course banks often will just intervene in a very literal

343
00:20:15.799 --> 00:20:19.759
way instead of actually prodding what's happening, and then it

344
00:20:20.200 --> 00:20:22.759
ends up just like not being very successful because by

345
00:20:22.759 --> 00:20:25.400
that time the victim is groomed and it can be devastating.

346
00:20:25.480 --> 00:20:27.599
Like you said, yeah, I was just going to say,

347
00:20:27.680 --> 00:20:30.680
it's like a grooming effect like they do with the

348
00:20:30.799 --> 00:20:33.880
romance scam and the pig butchering scam, you know, where

349
00:20:33.880 --> 00:20:38.319
they take the time to groom before they actually then

350
00:20:38.480 --> 00:20:43.279
start wanting you, you know, with transfer your money, however,

351
00:20:43.279 --> 00:20:48.119
they want it done right. So you had mentioned like

352
00:20:48.200 --> 00:20:51.440
the text message that someone had said they received from

353
00:20:51.559 --> 00:20:54.920
a friend asking for money after this data breach. Are

354
00:20:54.960 --> 00:20:59.079
there other things that you see, specific scams or you know,

355
00:20:59.480 --> 00:21:03.119
like emails or anything like that that have a tendency

356
00:21:03.200 --> 00:21:05.119
to happen right after these breaches.

357
00:21:06.160 --> 00:21:08.920
Yeah, I think, like you need to look for any

358
00:21:08.960 --> 00:21:12.920
kind of phishing text or emails, and I think the

359
00:21:12.960 --> 00:21:16.759
most frequent one will be email or a text will

360
00:21:16.759 --> 00:21:20.039
pretend to be from the body that was breached, from

361
00:21:20.119 --> 00:21:22.160
the entity that was bridged. So like let's say if

362
00:21:22.160 --> 00:21:25.720
it's the Mobile or Apple, you will get like emails

363
00:21:25.759 --> 00:21:28.240
that will talk about the bridge saying, oh, in a

364
00:21:28.279 --> 00:21:32.519
recent data breach, please verify your details. You know, so

365
00:21:32.880 --> 00:21:36.000
they will actually use the data bridge as an excuse

366
00:21:36.119 --> 00:21:39.319
to contact you and try to sort of like tell you, hey,

367
00:21:39.920 --> 00:21:44.000
it's a legitimate company just contacting their customers to let

368
00:21:44.000 --> 00:21:46.599
them know like any company would. So a lot of

369
00:21:46.640 --> 00:21:49.279
the times as well, people don't understand that when a

370
00:21:49.359 --> 00:21:54.599
data bridg happens, sometimes the company it's not yet aware

371
00:21:54.680 --> 00:21:58.240
that it happened, so that may take some time exactly,

372
00:21:58.279 --> 00:22:00.640
it may take some time to be the discovered that

373
00:22:00.720 --> 00:22:04.480
somebody has n'tered your infrastructure or something like that if

374
00:22:04.519 --> 00:22:07.200
you're a big company, so like any kind of things

375
00:22:07.240 --> 00:22:11.440
like that. But you you know, I'm absolutely positive that

376
00:22:11.480 --> 00:22:15.079
your details are immediately sold on too, so you by

377
00:22:15.160 --> 00:22:20.559
various other things too. So it could be unrelated phishing emails,

378
00:22:20.559 --> 00:22:24.599
offers to buy things, or you know, anything else like medical.

379
00:22:24.839 --> 00:22:26.920
You know, it can be something unrelated to but there'll

380
00:22:26.960 --> 00:22:28.759
be an up tick in you know.

381
00:22:29.039 --> 00:22:32.160
Uh see enough the amount right, Yeah.

382
00:22:32.599 --> 00:22:35.880
So you know, at the presentation yesterday that I had mentioned,

383
00:22:36.319 --> 00:22:39.799
a lady had asked a question and we were talking

384
00:22:40.000 --> 00:22:43.480
about how your information gets out there and data breaches

385
00:22:43.599 --> 00:22:46.160
is was the first one we talked about. And it's like,

386
00:22:46.480 --> 00:22:49.400
you know, you can't control when a company gets breached,

387
00:22:49.799 --> 00:22:54.119
but you can control the information you give to a company, right,

388
00:22:54.279 --> 00:22:57.200
And you just want to make sure the information you're

389
00:22:57.240 --> 00:23:01.839
giving is absolutely necessary to do whatever it is you're

390
00:23:01.880 --> 00:23:04.359
doing with that company, and and don't be afraid to

391
00:23:04.400 --> 00:23:07.519
ask questions. But you know, she she had asked the question,

392
00:23:07.880 --> 00:23:13.640
you know, is is government doing anything two to help

393
00:23:13.759 --> 00:23:17.480
stop this or to you know, to put things in

394
00:23:17.559 --> 00:23:22.720
play to make uh, to make the penalties harsher to

395
00:23:22.799 --> 00:23:24.160
make it more of a deterrent.

396
00:23:24.799 --> 00:23:27.559
Have you heard of anything that that.

397
00:23:27.640 --> 00:23:31.480
Maybe they're working on, maybe some recent bill or law

398
00:23:31.519 --> 00:23:32.720
that's been passed that.

399
00:23:35.000 --> 00:23:37.359
Yeah, I know, you know, I don't know of any

400
00:23:37.359 --> 00:23:41.240
specific like recent bills, but I know that comes are

401
00:23:41.279 --> 00:23:45.200
a big, big problem for banks, and they are desperately

402
00:23:45.240 --> 00:23:48.519
trying to figure out the way how to intervene, you know,

403
00:23:48.599 --> 00:23:51.680
and and and there are many companies that you know,

404
00:23:51.799 --> 00:23:54.680
like I've just joined a company that is actually looking

405
00:23:54.799 --> 00:23:58.400
to account for the human element and how do we

406
00:23:58.480 --> 00:24:01.119
prevent how do we enterect being in a good way.

407
00:24:01.640 --> 00:24:06.160
So I'm happy to say that I'm seeing more awareness

408
00:24:06.200 --> 00:24:10.400
around scams and how humans get exploited. So that's one thing.

409
00:24:10.720 --> 00:24:14.039
A second thing as well, like there are there are

410
00:24:14.119 --> 00:24:19.839
differences in companies, right, so anything governmental, anything to do

411
00:24:19.920 --> 00:24:24.119
with like heavy leak. Uh, you know, spaces and entities

412
00:24:24.160 --> 00:24:28.039
that are that have to adhere to compliance, okay, you know,

413
00:24:28.160 --> 00:24:31.279
such as hip hop or medical or you know some

414
00:24:31.400 --> 00:24:34.759
other compliance for like you know, banking industry. A lot

415
00:24:34.799 --> 00:24:39.000
of the times they keep those details what's called on

416
00:24:39.119 --> 00:24:43.000
prem on premise, which means that it's very difficult to

417
00:24:43.119 --> 00:24:47.119
infiltrate that if you're a malicious actor, okay, right, because

418
00:24:47.279 --> 00:24:51.039
the network doesn't allow like there's no communication between the

419
00:24:51.079 --> 00:24:54.240
outside network or you know, like things are not in

420
00:24:54.240 --> 00:24:56.359
a cloud and able.

421
00:24:56.079 --> 00:24:58.759
To you know, easier to penetrate.

422
00:24:59.079 --> 00:25:03.400
So yeah, the servers are like on the premise somewhere

423
00:25:03.400 --> 00:25:06.920
and they're not communicating with anything outside, or at least

424
00:25:06.920 --> 00:25:09.920
they limit the amount of things that can communicate with

425
00:25:09.960 --> 00:25:15.240
things like that. So that's that doesn't exclude the insight fraud, right,

426
00:25:15.319 --> 00:25:18.319
Somebody on the insight could also you know, be a

427
00:25:18.319 --> 00:25:21.400
malicious actor as well. So when you see these breaches

428
00:25:21.480 --> 00:25:24.759
that usually happened with things that perhaps don't have the

429
00:25:26.119 --> 00:25:30.000
most sensitive of details. But if you do have your

430
00:25:30.119 --> 00:25:35.400
let's say Apple account, I have my credit card connected

431
00:25:35.480 --> 00:25:38.680
to it because I'm purchasing you know, so you do

432
00:25:38.920 --> 00:25:42.680
have this sensitive information even with with like these other

433
00:25:42.759 --> 00:25:46.559
things that get breached. So it's really important to you know,

434
00:25:47.000 --> 00:25:49.240
like you said, maybe don't give them. You know, a

435
00:25:49.240 --> 00:25:53.000
lot of these companies they know they aspa date of birth.

436
00:25:53.079 --> 00:25:56.240
I always try to shield the mind. Unless you're my

437
00:25:56.359 --> 00:25:58.640
bank or you're my doctor, I don't think you need

438
00:25:58.680 --> 00:26:02.119
to know exactly like you don't have to wish me

439
00:26:02.160 --> 00:26:09.799
a happy birthday, Like I'm okay, you know, I'll be fine. Yeah,

440
00:26:10.000 --> 00:26:12.599
But those are the things like I would. I always

441
00:26:12.599 --> 00:26:16.480
say to people just like inventor, inventor birthday, that it's

442
00:26:16.519 --> 00:26:19.599
not your birthday, but it's like maybe you know, same year,

443
00:26:19.680 --> 00:26:22.319
but not the same month or a day, or you

444
00:26:22.359 --> 00:26:24.960
can you know, like invent a birthday that you like

445
00:26:25.039 --> 00:26:27.079
when you have to put it on a form, you

446
00:26:27.079 --> 00:26:27.920
have to put it on a.

447
00:26:27.880 --> 00:26:31.839
Form, right, and you want to be truthful, right, Yeah, And.

448
00:26:32.119 --> 00:26:34.640
I think one big thing that I've come across, and

449
00:26:34.640 --> 00:26:37.559
it always really puzzles me, right, I when you work

450
00:26:37.559 --> 00:26:41.480
as a contractor, let's say you accept a contract at

451
00:26:41.519 --> 00:26:44.880
a company you're a consultant or something like that, you

452
00:26:44.920 --> 00:26:47.920
will be dealing with a recruiter that it's like part

453
00:26:47.960 --> 00:26:52.200
of a company, let's say, and that company will always say, hey,

454
00:26:52.240 --> 00:26:54.839
can you give me your partial day to birth and

455
00:26:55.119 --> 00:26:58.039
your last for digits of the SSM for our internal

456
00:26:58.119 --> 00:27:01.359
tool and this tool is just management tools so that

457
00:27:01.440 --> 00:27:04.279
they you know, they're like if they have two people

458
00:27:04.319 --> 00:27:07.759
with the same name, like they can differentiate. Yeah, But

459
00:27:07.799 --> 00:27:10.359
then I'm thinking, why can't I just invent a pin

460
00:27:11.480 --> 00:27:15.240
right that it's not my assistant number, like forges by

461
00:27:15.279 --> 00:27:19.799
which you can call my bank and authenticate me. You know, absolutely,

462
00:27:20.279 --> 00:27:24.200
I invent things for that too, like I'll have a

463
00:27:24.240 --> 00:27:27.200
digit that I give them that it's not my assess So, like,

464
00:27:27.359 --> 00:27:29.680
I think a lot of these companies don't really think

465
00:27:29.720 --> 00:27:31.480
from the security standpoint at all.

466
00:27:32.519 --> 00:27:34.119
Well, right, you know, because they probably have a lot

467
00:27:34.119 --> 00:27:37.279
of different apartments, right, and you have one department that's

468
00:27:37.319 --> 00:27:39.119
going to do this and they feel they need this,

469
00:27:39.279 --> 00:27:41.880
and okay, well the last four of your Social Security

470
00:27:41.960 --> 00:27:43.799
number is going to be a way that I can

471
00:27:44.279 --> 00:27:46.839
that I can try. I can, you know, track your

472
00:27:46.880 --> 00:27:48.799
account in case somebody has the same name.

473
00:27:49.079 --> 00:27:49.319
Right.

474
00:27:49.680 --> 00:27:52.079
And it's actually interesting you mentioned that I was at

475
00:27:52.119 --> 00:27:57.640
one of my doctors recently and they actually had two

476
00:27:57.640 --> 00:28:08.279
different patients, same name, Joyce Petrowski, same birth date, everything, day, month, year,

477
00:28:09.640 --> 00:28:13.279
but the middle initial was different. And I was sitting

478
00:28:13.319 --> 00:28:17.759
there thinking, Wow, is this accurate or is this maybe

479
00:28:17.839 --> 00:28:19.759
somebody trying to impersonate me?

480
00:28:20.200 --> 00:28:20.440
Right?

481
00:28:22.039 --> 00:28:24.680
And it was interesting because they were telling me about

482
00:28:24.720 --> 00:28:27.720
the results of some lab work and I'm like, that

483
00:28:28.039 --> 00:28:30.759
test does not even sound familiar. When was that lab

484
00:28:30.799 --> 00:28:34.079
work done? And he told me the date, and I'm like,

485
00:28:35.039 --> 00:28:38.319
you know, you have someone else's information in my account

486
00:28:38.319 --> 00:28:41.480
because I wasn't even in the country on that date

487
00:28:41.559 --> 00:28:43.839
to go have labs done, right, And so that's how

488
00:28:43.880 --> 00:28:44.720
I found out about it.

489
00:28:45.440 --> 00:28:48.519
Wow, so somebody use your medical insurance.

490
00:28:48.799 --> 00:28:49.920
I don't know.

491
00:28:50.240 --> 00:28:53.960
I don't know that was, you know, on them to

492
00:28:55.000 --> 00:28:57.480
figure out. I think what happened was someone in the

493
00:28:57.519 --> 00:29:00.799
office saw the name in the birthday and ended up

494
00:29:00.799 --> 00:29:03.400
putting it in my account instead of the other person's account,

495
00:29:03.799 --> 00:29:07.000
not realizing they were that close. Right, That's what I think.

496
00:29:08.359 --> 00:29:10.480
But how easy would it be for someone.

497
00:29:10.480 --> 00:29:11.319
Else to do that?

498
00:29:11.640 --> 00:29:14.680
It could But so you're right, I totally agree. Like

499
00:29:14.720 --> 00:29:17.000
the I R S they very well could use the

500
00:29:17.119 --> 00:29:19.799
last four digits of your Social Security number because they

501
00:29:19.799 --> 00:29:23.839
have everybody's right from filing taxes. Yeah, but they came

502
00:29:23.920 --> 00:29:28.759
up with this identity theft pin identity protection pins right,

503
00:29:28.839 --> 00:29:29.680
the six digits.

504
00:29:29.720 --> 00:29:32.200
They give you a new one every year.

505
00:29:32.519 --> 00:29:35.839
And so they've they've gotten on board with that, and

506
00:29:36.279 --> 00:29:37.160
I exactly.

507
00:29:37.200 --> 00:29:39.279
I mean, like you can just as easily in a

508
00:29:39.400 --> 00:29:43.200
job tool like I can invent a pin, so it'll

509
00:29:43.240 --> 00:29:46.920
be almost the same, like the same as my SSN number, right,

510
00:29:47.400 --> 00:29:50.279
that it's unique to me, and it's very unlikely somebody

511
00:29:50.359 --> 00:29:52.519
is going to have somebody with the same name data

512
00:29:52.559 --> 00:29:55.160
Bert or whatever. Like it's right, they're exactly the same thing.

513
00:29:55.720 --> 00:29:58.279
But like one thing that really, you know, like it's

514
00:29:58.319 --> 00:30:02.720
funny you mentioned your you know, like this mishap with

515
00:30:02.880 --> 00:30:06.000
the club results. One of the things that I'm always

516
00:30:06.039 --> 00:30:09.880
really cautious about and always upsets me a little bit.

517
00:30:10.359 --> 00:30:14.200
When you're queuing, let's say, you know, the hospital or

518
00:30:14.240 --> 00:30:17.680
a doctor's office or something, there's people behind you. I

519
00:30:17.720 --> 00:30:20.240
can hear what the person is telling the receptionist.

520
00:30:20.359 --> 00:30:20.839
Oh right.

521
00:30:20.920 --> 00:30:23.400
They'll always say to you, hey, tell me your you know,

522
00:30:23.480 --> 00:30:26.559
pie the number or whatever and you know, date of birth.

523
00:30:26.680 --> 00:30:29.160
And I'm like, I'm telling you all, like I'm telling

524
00:30:29.200 --> 00:30:32.319
you you know, and then I'm having to confirm my

525
00:30:32.400 --> 00:30:34.319
name and somebody behind.

526
00:30:34.039 --> 00:30:36.559
Me here can hear it all, I know.

527
00:30:37.000 --> 00:30:39.240
And like I was kind of thinking, if you want

528
00:30:39.279 --> 00:30:41.599
to just hang out, you can just like really take

529
00:30:41.680 --> 00:30:44.920
down these details and then tell it. And it's you know,

530
00:30:45.240 --> 00:30:47.759
so I always take out my card and give it

531
00:30:47.799 --> 00:30:50.920
to them, you know, And like I'll say, I would

532
00:30:50.920 --> 00:30:53.519
prefer if you just take the information from here and

533
00:30:53.599 --> 00:30:57.039
if you want to confirm something that's not on a card,

534
00:30:57.079 --> 00:30:59.759
then like I'll confirm my you know.

535
00:31:00.200 --> 00:31:03.440
I just show it to me and I'll say yes, no.

536
00:31:04.279 --> 00:31:06.599
But I shouldn't be shouting my data birth and my

537
00:31:06.759 --> 00:31:10.160
life the number like for everybody like those. You know,

538
00:31:10.200 --> 00:31:13.599
people don't realize how much commerce even if I if

539
00:31:13.599 --> 00:31:16.240
they just hang around, then they see that and and

540
00:31:16.559 --> 00:31:20.519
and take that down. H you know, somebody can misuse it.

541
00:31:20.519 --> 00:31:24.160
It may not even an organized criminal, but like, you know,

542
00:31:24.319 --> 00:31:28.039
I could be hit by okay, she was like in

543
00:31:28.079 --> 00:31:31.200
the radiology. I could be hit by a scam that afternoon.

544
00:31:31.599 --> 00:31:35.960
That'll look realistic because they'll quote because you were there, right, Yeah,

545
00:31:36.240 --> 00:31:39.480
it's not exactly. It's not just perfect timing on their part.

546
00:31:39.759 --> 00:31:42.200
They knew you were there and so then they can

547
00:31:42.240 --> 00:31:44.680
target you with a specific scam. Yeah. I mean, it's

548
00:31:44.880 --> 00:31:48.480
it's just crazy. You know, I think you you almost

549
00:31:48.640 --> 00:31:52.240
have to try to think like a scammer, right and

550
00:31:52.240 --> 00:31:54.920
and I just think that you know what, I didn't.

551
00:31:54.960 --> 00:31:58.599
I wouldn't put anything past them, right, So for them

552
00:31:58.680 --> 00:32:01.559
to be hanging out for an hour or so and

553
00:32:02.039 --> 00:32:04.559
not being you know, seen that they're hanging out in

554
00:32:04.599 --> 00:32:07.519
an office to hear. I wouldn't put it past them.

555
00:32:07.920 --> 00:32:12.079
I just I mean, you know, like it's probably not realistic,

556
00:32:12.279 --> 00:32:15.440
but you know, like because it's so easy to steal

557
00:32:15.480 --> 00:32:20.079
that information, you know, But I'm kind of yeah, it's

558
00:32:20.079 --> 00:32:23.440
sortally olver the other. But then I'm thinking, if I

559
00:32:23.559 --> 00:32:26.200
was a smart camera, right and I wanted to make

560
00:32:26.240 --> 00:32:30.599
sure that I'm very realistic, I would do that, you know,

561
00:32:30.599 --> 00:32:33.480
knowing what I know about cameras and stuff, because the

562
00:32:33.480 --> 00:32:37.960
more you know of contextual information about somebody, the more

563
00:32:38.000 --> 00:32:40.880
realistic the call will sound, and the quicker you're going

564
00:32:40.960 --> 00:32:42.400
to get to what you need.

565
00:32:42.240 --> 00:32:44.519
With that rate, the quicker you're going to make it

566
00:32:44.559 --> 00:32:47.920
more believable that they're going to think you're authentic and

567
00:32:47.960 --> 00:32:48.799
you are who you say.

568
00:32:48.799 --> 00:32:50.559
You are, absolutely right.

569
00:32:50.640 --> 00:32:53.880
It's now you mentioned something earlier that you were starting

570
00:32:53.920 --> 00:32:56.599
to see a lot more people seem to be more

571
00:32:56.680 --> 00:33:01.039
aware of the scams. I think that's fantas fantastic because

572
00:33:01.359 --> 00:33:05.000
I think the first step in protecting yourself is one

573
00:33:05.599 --> 00:33:10.799
realizing that you are a target, and you very well could.

574
00:33:10.839 --> 00:33:13.039
I don't care how smart you are, I don't care

575
00:33:13.079 --> 00:33:16.440
how savvy you are any I don't care how less

576
00:33:16.480 --> 00:33:19.519
amount of money, more amount of money you have. Everyone's

577
00:33:19.559 --> 00:33:22.119
a target and everyone needs to realize that they are

578
00:33:22.720 --> 00:33:25.599
and that they could become a victim. And then it

579
00:33:25.640 --> 00:33:28.640
gets into you need to be aware and educated, right,

580
00:33:29.119 --> 00:33:31.240
And so I'm so happy to hear that you're seeing

581
00:33:31.279 --> 00:33:33.279
that that people are more aware.

582
00:33:34.519 --> 00:33:38.799
I'm seeing, like, I think what's exciting that's happening is

583
00:33:38.839 --> 00:33:44.000
that the organizations such as banks, my realizing that you know,

584
00:33:44.039 --> 00:33:47.680
scams at becoming a huge problem, right, and so like

585
00:33:47.799 --> 00:33:51.759
there's like where's even just a decade ago, or less

586
00:33:51.759 --> 00:33:55.359
than a decade ago, personal fraud was just kind of

587
00:33:55.440 --> 00:33:58.599
like dismissed by the fraud professionals, you know, it was like,

588
00:33:58.640 --> 00:34:02.079
well that's your response for you know, sending this money.

589
00:34:02.359 --> 00:34:06.440
Whereas now I think there's there's I feel like there's

590
00:34:06.440 --> 00:34:10.400
more empathy coming from the professionals, and there's more interest

591
00:34:10.519 --> 00:34:14.679
in understanding of the manipulation that goes into it. It's

592
00:34:14.760 --> 00:34:18.880
no longer I think we're changing the slight shift, you know,

593
00:34:19.079 --> 00:34:24.400
in how the society is viewing, you know, scam victimization.

594
00:34:24.800 --> 00:34:27.519
And I'm really pleased about that. Yeah, that's really great.

595
00:34:28.039 --> 00:34:30.599
Yeah, I know one of our other advisory board members

596
00:34:31.400 --> 00:34:34.800
did a video on that recently, she had happened to

597
00:34:34.840 --> 00:34:38.559
see a post somebody made an anonymous post on the

598
00:34:38.599 --> 00:34:41.519
next door app about being a victim, and they kind

599
00:34:41.559 --> 00:34:44.320
of went through the things and not all the people

600
00:34:44.320 --> 00:34:48.559
that were commenting, but some of the people were just downright.

601
00:34:48.199 --> 00:34:51.039
Mean and blaming hum or her.

602
00:34:51.639 --> 00:34:54.199
For the situation they got into. And it was like,

603
00:34:55.679 --> 00:34:57.880
you better be careful because you know what you might

604
00:34:57.960 --> 00:35:00.000
be the next one and then you're gonna.

605
00:34:59.760 --> 00:35:04.079
Be like, oh wow, sh right. Yet believe with a

606
00:35:04.119 --> 00:35:06.880
lot more empathy, I think.

607
00:35:06.880 --> 00:35:09.679
Not just like I mean, that's just not very nice

608
00:35:09.719 --> 00:35:12.239
as a human being, but I also can explain that,

609
00:35:12.440 --> 00:35:15.360
I can explain it in a psychology way, right, So

610
00:35:16.039 --> 00:35:19.239
people do that, like we always we have to think

611
00:35:19.760 --> 00:35:23.320
about ourselves in a positive light that you know that

612
00:35:23.559 --> 00:35:27.360
kind of like posters are self esteem and it's like

613
00:35:27.519 --> 00:35:29.719
makes us a function in human being because if we

614
00:35:29.800 --> 00:35:32.760
didn't have a self esteem, we would be depressed and

615
00:35:32.800 --> 00:35:34.920
we wouldn't feel good about ourselves and we would not

616
00:35:35.039 --> 00:35:39.079
be you know, we wouldn't be good. Yeah, exactly. So

617
00:35:39.239 --> 00:35:43.239
people tend to have this belief that it wouldn't happen

618
00:35:43.320 --> 00:35:46.480
to them because they want to control, like they want

619
00:35:46.480 --> 00:35:48.519
to feel like they have the control. It's an illusion

620
00:35:48.519 --> 00:35:51.559
of control. It's a quality bias. Right, People want to

621
00:35:51.599 --> 00:35:55.559
believe that they could control situations that around them, right, So,

622
00:35:55.679 --> 00:35:58.559
like you see that not just with the fraud victimization,

623
00:35:58.760 --> 00:36:03.800
but also with victims of sexual crimes. Like she was

624
00:36:03.880 --> 00:36:07.239
out at ten pm. She deserved it, she was wearing

625
00:36:07.280 --> 00:36:10.159
this dance, like we try to rationalize it. And the

626
00:36:10.239 --> 00:36:12.840
reason why we rationalize it is maybe not that we

627
00:36:13.079 --> 00:36:15.679
want to be mean to that victim, but it's almost

628
00:36:15.679 --> 00:36:18.280
a fear in us, and we're controlling for that fear.

629
00:36:18.719 --> 00:36:21.320
Like if I'm not out at ten pm, if I'm

630
00:36:21.320 --> 00:36:22.119
not wearing that.

631
00:36:22.559 --> 00:36:28.639
Exactly, Yes, you're rationalizing why that couldn't happen to Yes, exactly.

632
00:36:28.719 --> 00:36:30.719
So I think a lot of the times people turn

633
00:36:30.800 --> 00:36:34.599
on a broad victims because they want to believe it

634
00:36:34.599 --> 00:36:37.199
wouldn't happen to them. But I've actually found that people

635
00:36:37.199 --> 00:36:40.920
who hold that belief, right, people who have a strong

636
00:36:40.960 --> 00:36:43.599
belief that comes only happened to valible people and stuff

637
00:36:43.639 --> 00:36:47.400
like that, actually more vulnerable because it makes them less careful.

638
00:36:47.480 --> 00:36:50.800
You know, yeah, yes, it lets their guard down, right,

639
00:36:50.920 --> 00:36:53.960
you know. And speaking of that, you know, I've seen

640
00:36:54.079 --> 00:36:59.320
some online. I've just come across some different people, whether

641
00:36:59.360 --> 00:37:03.599
they're in the education unit, like maybe a college professor

642
00:37:03.599 --> 00:37:11.559
in their class is doing a program or project, that's

643
00:37:11.559 --> 00:37:13.559
what I want to say. They're doing a project, you know,

644
00:37:13.679 --> 00:37:15.960
or something like that, and they come up with like

645
00:37:16.039 --> 00:37:19.840
a checklist, you know, like how vulnerable are you or

646
00:37:19.880 --> 00:37:24.159
how much at risk are you to be defrauded or scammed?

647
00:37:24.199 --> 00:37:27.800
And it's like, on the surface, I don't like those.

648
00:37:27.920 --> 00:37:30.480
And the reason is, I mean, some of the questions

649
00:37:30.480 --> 00:37:32.880
in there might be really good questions, and they might

650
00:37:33.119 --> 00:37:37.119
they might make you think about, well, yeah, I need

651
00:37:37.159 --> 00:37:40.280
to fix my email because I am at risk. So

652
00:37:40.320 --> 00:37:43.199
it's an you know for that, But on the surface,

653
00:37:43.639 --> 00:37:47.119
I don't want people if they take it and get

654
00:37:47.119 --> 00:37:50.199
a really low score so they have like a low risk,

655
00:37:50.880 --> 00:37:53.159
I don't want them to let their guard down because

656
00:37:53.199 --> 00:37:55.559
the minute they let their guard down and think, oh

657
00:37:55.599 --> 00:37:58.480
I have a low risk, you know, it's very rare chance.

658
00:37:58.239 --> 00:38:00.400
It's going to happen to me. That's and it's going

659
00:38:00.480 --> 00:38:02.159
to happen, right, yeah.

660
00:38:02.320 --> 00:38:04.519
I think, like I mean, depending on whether you're just

661
00:38:04.559 --> 00:38:07.159
doing research for the sake, like you know, like whether

662
00:38:07.199 --> 00:38:09.880
you want to see how many people feel it wouldn't

663
00:38:09.880 --> 00:38:12.199
happen to them, and then you manipulate it something else,

664
00:38:12.239 --> 00:38:14.519
and like if it's a real research or is it

665
00:38:14.639 --> 00:38:18.039
some kind of a thing. Because every single fraud victim

666
00:38:18.079 --> 00:38:21.840
that I've ever spoken to, every single one, first thing

667
00:38:21.880 --> 00:38:24.039
they said to me, I never thought this would happen

668
00:38:24.079 --> 00:38:27.119
to me because I'm a smart person. Yeah, right, And

669
00:38:27.199 --> 00:38:29.480
I think, like we need to learn from that, right.

670
00:38:29.639 --> 00:38:33.000
So if you are asking a very literal question, do

671
00:38:33.079 --> 00:38:36.079
you think you're vulnerable? Everybody's going to say no. And

672
00:38:36.119 --> 00:38:40.039
it's only when they scammed that they realize their own vulnerability.

673
00:38:40.599 --> 00:38:43.519
And some don't even realize that. I've spoken to some

674
00:38:43.599 --> 00:38:47.079
victims who say, hey, I accept as part of life,

675
00:38:47.360 --> 00:38:49.760
and you know, I'm not going to change anything about me.

676
00:38:50.159 --> 00:38:52.119
I still want to believe the rest in people. So

677
00:38:52.400 --> 00:38:55.079
like a lot of the time is individual, but a

678
00:38:55.119 --> 00:38:59.000
lot of people only start paying attention to scam advice

679
00:38:59.239 --> 00:39:03.199
or fraud advice for education when they are scammed, because

680
00:39:03.960 --> 00:39:06.440
I think it's one of those things in our lives

681
00:39:06.480 --> 00:39:10.639
we like to feel because you're I think it's that

682
00:39:10.800 --> 00:39:13.760
social stigma that connects being a victim of a scam

683
00:39:13.840 --> 00:39:15.840
with being stupid or gullible.

684
00:39:15.679 --> 00:39:17.639
Or something like that, right, and that we need to

685
00:39:17.719 --> 00:39:18.440
change the guest.

686
00:39:18.559 --> 00:39:18.760
Right.

687
00:39:18.960 --> 00:39:22.159
I mean that's and I'm trying in these presentations, right.

688
00:39:22.199 --> 00:39:25.039
I mean it's like I try to reinforce scams have

689
00:39:25.199 --> 00:39:29.519
nothing to do with intelligence, because if they did, you know, yes,

690
00:39:29.599 --> 00:39:31.360
they have something to do with money, but if it

691
00:39:31.440 --> 00:39:35.599
was really based on intelligence, they would somehow be tricking

692
00:39:35.639 --> 00:39:38.840
you into taking an IQ test to see how you scored,

693
00:39:39.119 --> 00:39:40.760
and they're only going to go after the ones that

694
00:39:40.840 --> 00:39:45.800
score low. Right, everybody's a target, right, everybody.

695
00:39:46.719 --> 00:39:50.159
Well, I will tell you something quite interesting about that too. Right,

696
00:39:50.400 --> 00:39:54.760
there is actually a research out there that, okay, hypothesizes

697
00:39:55.480 --> 00:39:58.119
that you know, in the olden day, like the olden

698
00:39:58.199 --> 00:40:01.480
days I'm talking about like a decade ago or more, right,

699
00:40:02.559 --> 00:40:05.239
there would still be emails that were like, hey, I'm

700
00:40:05.280 --> 00:40:08.480
a Nigerian print someone like wanting to you know, so

701
00:40:08.559 --> 00:40:11.880
there were a lot of like bank officials from Nigeria.

702
00:40:12.440 --> 00:40:14.400
There was even like I think there was an email

703
00:40:14.519 --> 00:40:18.480
circulating like a Nigerian astronaut lost in space or something

704
00:40:18.599 --> 00:40:24.440
like that. Okay, Yeah, they were incredibly stupid, incredibly just

705
00:40:24.480 --> 00:40:29.159
like non believable emails. But the sad thing is, right,

706
00:40:29.239 --> 00:40:32.800
like there's a hypothesis and it was like a chess

707
00:40:32.840 --> 00:40:37.519
done by Microsoft that like sometimes commers sent such obvious

708
00:40:37.559 --> 00:40:42.760
scams to identify the most vulnerable victims. So they are

709
00:40:42.800 --> 00:40:45.880
going after people who maybe have early on set on

710
00:40:45.960 --> 00:40:51.559
dementia or some other cognitive disabilities, or they really don't

711
00:40:51.639 --> 00:40:55.199
know they're not Internet sava so they've never come across

712
00:40:55.199 --> 00:40:58.480
anything like that, or you know, they're catching, you know,

713
00:40:58.800 --> 00:41:04.239
socifically identifying people who will then be hit with other scams,

714
00:41:04.440 --> 00:41:04.639
you know.

715
00:41:04.639 --> 00:41:08.239
What I mean, that are really more vulnerable for reasons

716
00:41:08.320 --> 00:41:09.360
beyond their control.

717
00:41:10.199 --> 00:41:12.679
So I think there is that the equivalent of an

718
00:41:12.719 --> 00:41:16.239
IQ test you mentioned, right, Yes, It's like there is

719
00:41:16.280 --> 00:41:20.320
definitely And you know, that's something that I always try

720
00:41:20.360 --> 00:41:23.320
to talk about when I go to talk to elderly

721
00:41:23.360 --> 00:41:26.039
people or people that are, you know, in the latest

722
00:41:26.039 --> 00:41:28.280
stages of your life. I don't like the words elderly

723
00:41:28.599 --> 00:41:31.159
because you can be in the latest stages of your

724
00:41:31.159 --> 00:41:34.000
life and still be quite young in the mind and

725
00:41:34.119 --> 00:41:37.079
heart and you know, like exactly. But one of the

726
00:41:37.119 --> 00:41:40.159
things that like why they're so so viciously targeted is

727
00:41:40.199 --> 00:41:43.119
because they're the stage of the life where they are

728
00:41:43.159 --> 00:41:47.239
financially stable. The paid off their mortgages, they have ansions.

729
00:41:47.719 --> 00:41:50.840
They are very lucrative. So just by the sheer volume

730
00:41:50.880 --> 00:41:54.280
of scams send to people of their demographic will mean

731
00:41:54.320 --> 00:41:56.239
the statistically one will pay off.

732
00:41:57.800 --> 00:42:00.079
That And that makes total sense. And you know you

733
00:42:00.119 --> 00:42:06.840
can you can. You can buy list of people. You know,

734
00:42:07.039 --> 00:42:11.280
you can tailor it down based on demographics, you know,

735
00:42:11.400 --> 00:42:13.840
a bunch of different demographics and things. And so they

736
00:42:13.840 --> 00:42:18.000
can buy list of people that are specifically sixty and above,

737
00:42:18.360 --> 00:42:21.519
or they could do eighty and above or ninety and above,

738
00:42:21.599 --> 00:42:25.159
thinking that maybe they'll be more vulnerable because things are

739
00:42:25.159 --> 00:42:28.480
going on beyond their control, right with their mind or

740
00:42:28.519 --> 00:42:29.599
their whatever.

741
00:42:29.960 --> 00:42:33.159
Yeah, no, that's definitely And I think, like I think,

742
00:42:33.559 --> 00:42:35.679
you know, this is my hypothesis. I don't have any

743
00:42:35.760 --> 00:42:39.159
solid evidence. But for example, when you think about sextortion

744
00:42:39.360 --> 00:42:43.480
emails just even a few years ago, they were being

745
00:42:43.519 --> 00:42:47.599
sent via email to grown ups, you know, grown nuts

746
00:42:47.840 --> 00:42:51.239
saying like you've been caught, you know, like visiting webs

747
00:42:51.239 --> 00:42:53.719
that you shouldn't. Your family is going to be notified,

748
00:42:53.760 --> 00:42:55.880
your people, your work are going to be notified. So

749
00:42:56.320 --> 00:43:01.119
now sextortion is aimed at teenagers. And then I was

750
00:43:01.159 --> 00:43:04.840
thinking to myself, like and it's it's really harmful. But

751
00:43:04.880 --> 00:43:07.159
I was thinking to myself, if somebody targeted me as

752
00:43:07.159 --> 00:43:09.239
a teenager, I wouldn't have any money to give them,

753
00:43:09.599 --> 00:43:12.960
So like, why is it the teenagers are targeted? Probably

754
00:43:12.960 --> 00:43:16.760
because you know, like teenagers nowadays get more money, they

755
00:43:16.760 --> 00:43:20.119
have more gadgets, they can leverage, you know, like they

756
00:43:20.119 --> 00:43:22.320
have more pocket money maybe that they can.

757
00:43:22.239 --> 00:43:24.440
They have access they have access to or they have

758
00:43:24.480 --> 00:43:26.039
access to the exactly.

759
00:43:26.239 --> 00:43:29.159
Yeah, because like if somebody hit me when I was sixteen,

760
00:43:29.360 --> 00:43:32.079
like I'm you know, I don't know what I would

761
00:43:32.079 --> 00:43:34.000
give them, my walkman or something. I don't know.

762
00:43:34.639 --> 00:43:38.960
Yeah, well true, I mean it's and plus you know,

763
00:43:39.000 --> 00:43:41.760
they say that your brain is not fully developed until

764
00:43:41.800 --> 00:43:44.320
you're what it was twenty five, Now they're saying twenty

765
00:43:44.360 --> 00:43:47.079
eight or something like that. So yeah, you know, there's

766
00:43:47.360 --> 00:43:49.440
a lot of things. But we've only got a couple

767
00:43:49.480 --> 00:43:51.119
of minutes left, and I want to get to this

768
00:43:51.280 --> 00:43:52.320
article that you wrote.

769
00:43:53.800 --> 00:43:54.880
Was it it's.

770
00:43:54.719 --> 00:43:58.199
The data breaches, a chance for opportunistic scammers and what

771
00:43:58.239 --> 00:44:01.159
you should watch for. It looks like it was September

772
00:44:01.199 --> 00:44:02.440
third of twenty twenty one.

773
00:44:03.480 --> 00:44:06.800
Yeah, I wrote it. I think, Yeah, like I ended

774
00:44:06.880 --> 00:44:10.679
up writing that article. It's still current now in terms

775
00:44:10.679 --> 00:44:13.280
of advice. I think it was the data bridge by

776
00:44:13.280 --> 00:44:16.920
Tim Mobile at that time, and that after that data breach,

777
00:44:17.000 --> 00:44:21.519
I've seen tons and tons of like people texting me,

778
00:44:21.920 --> 00:44:24.480
you know, for big bushing scams and stuff like that.

779
00:44:25.159 --> 00:44:27.159
But like all of the advice in that article, if

780
00:44:27.159 --> 00:44:30.239
you share with your you know, like quite the audience,

781
00:44:30.519 --> 00:44:32.079
that advice still stands.

782
00:44:32.360 --> 00:44:32.599
Okay.

783
00:44:32.599 --> 00:44:35.519
So that's why I kind of republished it recently on

784
00:44:35.519 --> 00:44:39.400
my LinkedIn because it's you know, it happens up to

785
00:44:39.440 --> 00:44:41.119
every data bridge, you.

786
00:44:41.079 --> 00:44:41.920
Know, exactly.

787
00:44:42.039 --> 00:44:44.599
Yeah, And I do have it in the show notes.

788
00:44:44.679 --> 00:44:48.159
I have the actual link that somebody will be able

789
00:44:48.199 --> 00:44:52.000
to access. It was a really really good article. You know,

790
00:44:52.119 --> 00:44:55.559
beware of social media campaigns and websites pretending to be

791
00:44:55.639 --> 00:44:59.360
fraud recovery services. I think I just saw when I

792
00:44:59.440 --> 00:45:02.880
was download hoading some public service announcements from the FBI.

793
00:45:03.119 --> 00:45:05.239
I think one of the ones they had in the

794
00:45:05.320 --> 00:45:08.760
last maybe three or four years dealt exactly with that,

795
00:45:09.239 --> 00:45:13.000
you know, fraudulent companies trying to entice you that they

796
00:45:13.000 --> 00:45:17.280
can get your money back when they're obviously not going

797
00:45:17.320 --> 00:45:18.840
to be able to the only people that can do

798
00:45:18.880 --> 00:45:22.079
that are going to be law enforcement and or the

799
00:45:22.159 --> 00:45:25.079
attorneys or the attorney general, district attorneys whoever are doing

800
00:45:25.079 --> 00:45:25.719
the prosecution.

801
00:45:25.840 --> 00:45:29.320
So it's also very very difficult to recover funds.

802
00:45:29.320 --> 00:45:33.800
Oh, it is absolutely, I mean the organized crime, yeah, yeah,

803
00:45:33.920 --> 00:45:39.800
it's There was a couple here in Arizona that were

804
00:45:40.320 --> 00:45:43.159
arrested I think maybe two years ago, three years ago,

805
00:45:43.239 --> 00:45:46.519
and they went through all of their you know, hearings

806
00:45:46.519 --> 00:45:48.400
and all that stuff, and it was for I think

807
00:45:48.719 --> 00:45:51.360
medicare fraud and stuff like that.

808
00:45:52.679 --> 00:45:55.039
And they had a lot of assets.

809
00:45:55.119 --> 00:45:57.079
You know, they were here in the States, and so

810
00:45:57.119 --> 00:45:59.920
they had used the money to like buy vehicles and houses,

811
00:46:00.079 --> 00:46:02.760
and so they had a lot of property that was

812
00:46:02.880 --> 00:46:07.280
then able to be seized and sold. But it's sold

813
00:46:07.280 --> 00:46:09.599
for pennies on the dollars, so if anybody was getting

814
00:46:09.639 --> 00:46:12.320
anything back, you were only getting pennies on the dollar back.

815
00:46:12.679 --> 00:46:15.400
But the majority of these scams, the money is out

816
00:46:15.400 --> 00:46:18.440
of the country and it's gone, right.

817
00:46:18.840 --> 00:46:21.440
Yeah, I would say like a couple doing that, that's

818
00:46:21.480 --> 00:46:25.159
a small time crook, you know, like organized crime, like

819
00:46:25.199 --> 00:46:29.199
big butchering scams that originate in Vietnam, Like the money

820
00:46:29.320 --> 00:46:32.519
is gone and like you know, and the cross border

821
00:46:32.559 --> 00:46:34.840
element makes it very difficult to recover anything.

822
00:46:35.239 --> 00:46:37.360
Well, it does, because you're adding a whole other layer

823
00:46:37.400 --> 00:46:40.039
into the investigation. You have to work with that local

824
00:46:40.480 --> 00:46:44.159
law enforcement, and sometimes they're very happy to work with

825
00:46:44.679 --> 00:46:45.719
our law enforcement.

826
00:46:45.840 --> 00:46:48.320
Other times they're not as excited.

827
00:46:48.400 --> 00:46:52.239
They have bigger fish to fry per se, right, and

828
00:46:52.280 --> 00:46:56.239
so they're not necessarily interested in allocating resources to help

829
00:46:56.280 --> 00:47:00.519
our law enforcement trying to find these perpetrators. Yeah, it

830
00:47:00.599 --> 00:47:03.239
just adds a whole other layer of complexity to it

831
00:47:03.360 --> 00:47:04.920
and makes it all the more difficult.

832
00:47:05.039 --> 00:47:07.960
But we are getting to the end of the time.

833
00:47:08.079 --> 00:47:09.079
It went really quickly.

834
00:47:10.400 --> 00:47:12.519
I know it always does. It's always fun.

835
00:47:12.639 --> 00:47:15.320
Yeah, So thank you so much for coming back on.

836
00:47:15.440 --> 00:47:17.199
I really appreciate it, and I want to have you

837
00:47:17.679 --> 00:47:21.000
back on on a regular basis. You have has your

838
00:47:21.079 --> 00:47:22.960
new book come out? I know you said you were

839
00:47:23.000 --> 00:47:24.920
working on updating it.

840
00:47:26.000 --> 00:47:29.559
Yeah, I'm updating it. There's no date yet, but you

841
00:47:29.639 --> 00:47:33.320
might as well wait for the for the updated version

842
00:47:33.320 --> 00:47:35.679
because I added a lot of things on AI. How

843
00:47:35.760 --> 00:47:38.760
AI is going to affect us and stuff like that. So, okay,

844
00:47:38.760 --> 00:47:41.159
there are a lot more case studies that have of

845
00:47:41.280 --> 00:47:43.760
newer scams and things like that. So I would say,

846
00:47:43.800 --> 00:47:47.280
if you think you know purchasing the book, uh, just wait,

847
00:47:47.360 --> 00:47:50.519
wait a couple of months. Okay, there'll probably be a

848
00:47:50.519 --> 00:47:51.199
new audition.

849
00:47:51.320 --> 00:47:55.599
And the book is the Psychology of fraud, persuasion and

850
00:47:55.639 --> 00:47:56.519
scam techniques.

851
00:47:56.639 --> 00:47:57.440
Scam techniques.

852
00:47:57.719 --> 00:47:59.920
So is it going to be like have a number

853
00:48:00.079 --> 00:48:02.400
two after it, or volume two or something.

854
00:48:02.800 --> 00:48:04.840
It's going to be volume two, and it's like a

855
00:48:04.880 --> 00:48:08.119
different color, Like I have a trademark image that I love.

856
00:48:08.440 --> 00:48:10.159
It's the same image, but it's going to be a

857
00:48:10.159 --> 00:48:12.880
different color. It's going to be purple instead of turquoise,

858
00:48:13.480 --> 00:48:15.079
so you can recognize if it's going to be a

859
00:48:15.119 --> 00:48:15.800
second edition.

860
00:48:16.079 --> 00:48:17.880
Okay, all right, very good my book.

861
00:48:18.000 --> 00:48:20.880
Now it's still okay, But like if you are thinking

862
00:48:20.920 --> 00:48:23.079
of purchasing, I would wait for the second edition.

863
00:48:23.280 --> 00:48:25.239
Just yeah, there'll be a lot more information and with

864
00:48:25.360 --> 00:48:30.400
AI that's huge, and it's so confusing to tell what's

865
00:48:30.440 --> 00:48:34.679
real and what's artificially generated. And it'll be out really quickly,

866
00:48:35.440 --> 00:48:37.440
and you know what's you could probably write a book

867
00:48:37.440 --> 00:48:40.519
every day, right because this stuff changes so quickly.

868
00:48:41.760 --> 00:48:44.679
True, maybe not a book, but like a short short.

869
00:48:45.760 --> 00:48:49.320
A short novel every day every week or whatever, but right,

870
00:48:49.679 --> 00:48:54.039
because it changes so rapidly it does. Anyways, Well, thank

871
00:48:54.079 --> 00:48:56.679
you so much. I really appreciate you being on and

872
00:48:56.840 --> 00:48:59.719
we're going to have you back soon. Okay, awesome, all right,

873
00:49:00.920 --> 00:49:04.679
thank you, take care. All right, thank you everybody for

874
00:49:04.800 --> 00:49:07.239
joining us today. I hope you got some more information

875
00:49:07.320 --> 00:49:12.400
on data breaches and what to do. Doctor Martina Dove

876
00:49:12.480 --> 00:49:17.199
is a valuable source of information. The link to her

877
00:49:17.320 --> 00:49:19.360
article is going to be in the show notes, so

878
00:49:19.400 --> 00:49:21.920
click on that and read her article. But just know

879
00:49:21.960 --> 00:49:24.920
when data breaches happen and you get that information or

880
00:49:24.960 --> 00:49:27.360
you hear about it, just know that there's going to

881
00:49:27.360 --> 00:49:31.079
be an uptick in people trying to email you, the

882
00:49:31.079 --> 00:49:35.559
phishing or the texting they call the schmishing, or you know,

883
00:49:35.679 --> 00:49:38.960
the voice over the phone and all of that stuff.

884
00:49:39.039 --> 00:49:41.199
So you just have to be a little bit more

885
00:49:41.440 --> 00:49:44.760
on aware of that. You could have an uptick in

886
00:49:44.800 --> 00:49:47.480
that and be on the lookout. You should always have

887
00:49:47.599 --> 00:49:50.000
your guard up and be on the lookout for what's

888
00:49:50.039 --> 00:49:53.360
going on. Don't forget to get on our website, Roseadvocacy

889
00:49:53.360 --> 00:49:57.559
dot org, look for the resources, follow us on social media,

890
00:49:57.599 --> 00:50:00.559
and sign up for our newsletter. Thank you, and you

891
00:50:00.599 --> 00:50:04.079
guys will be enjoying Brian Watson for the next few weeks.

892
00:50:04.280 --> 00:50:05.159
All right, take care.

893
00:50:07.039 --> 00:50:10.079
Well that's all the knowledge for this episode. Tune in

894
00:50:10.239 --> 00:50:14.320
every Tuesday at eight am Pacific time on KFOURHD Radio

895
00:50:14.480 --> 00:50:19.159
at KFOURHD dot com as Joyce explores a variety of knowledge.

896
00:50:19.199 --> 00:50:22.760
So you have the power to make scam protection your

897
00:50:22.920 --> 00:50:26.559
healthy habit and until then, feel free to reach out

898
00:50:26.599 --> 00:50:29.159
to Joyce and let's talk about scams.